As you may have heard the Permanent Judicial Commission of the General Assembly (GAPJC) of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) published four decisions yesterday. Wait, let me rephrase that – You may have heard about a GAPJC decision that hit the news yesterday. (For the polity wonks I actually think one of the other decisions is more interesting so I will try to comment on that in the next couple of days.)

The case is Disciplinary Case 220-08: Jane Adams Spahr, Appellant (Accused), v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) through the Presbytery of the Redwoods, Appellee (Complainant). Of the 15 GAPJC commissioners who heard the case, six of them signed one or both dissenting opinions.

This disciplinary case results from an accusation that was filed after the Rev. Spahr conducted same-sex marriages during the window when these marriages were permissible under civil law in the state of California. Among other things, this case became a test of whether a PC(USA) minister (teaching elder) could preform a ceremony presented as a marriage when permitted by the state.

At the present time the precedent for the interpretation of the PC(USA) constitution on this matter is the previous decision regarding Rev. Spahr (the Spahr 2008 decision 218-12) which now-famously stated (pg. 4):

The ceremonies that are the subject of this case were not marriages as the term is defined by W-4.9001. These were ceremonies between women, not between a man and a woman. Both parties acknowledged the ceremonies in question were not marriages as defined by the Book of Order. It is not improper for ministers of the Word and Sacrament to perform same sex ceremonies. At least four times, the larger church has rejected overtures that would prohibit blessing the unions of same sex couples. By the definition in W-4.9001, a same sex ceremony can never be a marriage. The SPJC found Spahr guilty of doing that which by definition cannot be done. One cannot characterize same sex ceremonies as marriages for the purpose of disciplining a minister of the Word and Sacrament and at the same time declare that such ceremonies are not marriages for legal or ecclesiastical purposes.

As that paragraph implies, the GAPJC overturned her earlier conviction on appeal because under the PC(USA) Constitution’s definition there is no such thing as a same-sex marriage.

Having now been charged and found guilty by the Presbytery PJC of new similar offenses in this regard the court had to decide on appeal whether her conviction on grounds of representing a same-sex ceremony as a marriage was correct.

In the decision nine specifications of error were regrouped into three different specifications of error, none of which was sustained. The first dealt with all the constitutional issues, the second that the various PJC’s have erred by “usurping the legislative power of the General Assembly,” and the third that there was a procedural error with the Synod PJC rephrasing the charges.

Regarding the constitutional issues the GAPJC decision says:

In Spahr 2008, Spahr was directed to refrain from implying, stating, or representing that a same-sex ceremony is a marriage. Within months of that order, Spahr performed marriage ceremonies for approximately sixteen same-sex couples. Although counsel for both parties confirmed that state law recognizes the legality of these marriages, the change in state law did not and could not change what is permissible for marriages to be authorized by the PC(USA).

and

The issue is not simply the same-sex ceremony. It is the misrepresentation that the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) recognizes the ceremony and the resulting relationship to be a marriage in the eyes of the church. By the definition of W-4.9001, such a result cannot be. So the critical question is not whether the definitional language creates proscribed conduct, it is whether it is permissible to represent that one is doing something which one cannot constitutionally do.

and

This Commission agrees with the SPJC regarding Specification of Error No. 1 d and e (Appellant’s Specifications of Error Nos. 6, 7, and 8). The SPJC correctly found that “being faithful to Scripture and the Constitution on other matters does not provide a defense for the actions charged in this case,” and “the constitutional interpretations of Spahr (2008) and Southard by the PPJC are not inconsistent with the Book of Order when read as a whole.” Both the PPJC and SPJC found that Spahr’s conduct violated the Constitution.

The Decision portion where all this is laid out is relatively short, encompassing just over one page. Pretty short for nine specifications of error.

One commissioner, Barbara Bundick, wrote a concurring opinion which brings out a couple of interesting points. The first is that in some jurisdictions even if same-sex marriage is recognized by the state if it is not recognized by the clergy’s denomination that can invalidate the marriage. That is not an issue in this case since California does not have that provision but the point is made that those preforming marriages must be cautious about this in some jurisdictions.

Secondly, this concurrence takes issue with the GAPJC decision for not addressing liturgical forms.  It says:

While I affirm the majority opinion, I have serious concerns that the majority, in affirming the SPJC’s decision, is also affirming the SPJC’s criticism of the content of the ceremonies and the counseling Spahr conducted. In drawing a distinction between same-sex blessings, which are permissible, and same-sex marriages, which are not, the authoritative interpretations have gone beyond the definition of marriage to dictate the nature of the liturgy that can be used in same-sex blessings. […] In Spahr 2008, this Commission stated “the liturgy should be kept distinct for the two types of services.” This aspect of the precedent has created a difficult situation for those who minister to the GLBT community.

There is an inevitable and legitimate overlap between a same-sex blessing ceremony and a mixed-sex marriage ceremony. Both ceremonies involve a couple making promises to each other in the presence of God, their families and their community. As oft noted, “Form follows function.” Moreover, many, if not most of the trappings surrounding such ceremonies reflect popular culture rather than Biblical command. Given the overlap and the input from popular culture, how the two liturgies can be “kept distinct” is a mystery.

Requiring different liturgies has led to judicial micromanagement of the liturgy.

and concludes

The best solution is for the General Assembly to amend the definition of marriage to authorize teaching elders and commissioned ruling elders to preside at the marriages of same-sex couples in civil jurisdictions that recognize such marriages as legal. The definition now found in W-4.9001 was never designed for these circumstances. It was adopted in a world where same-sex marriages were inconceivable. By retaining that definition despite the increasing number of jurisdictions recognizing same-sex marriage, the church creates a form of second class citizenship for faithful Christians despite all the other places in the Book of Order where the full equality of persons regardless of sexual orientation is affirmed. I encourage the General Assembly to so act.

The second concurrence was signed by three commissioners and begins by looking at the Appellant’s arguments and suggesting “The Appellant asks this Commission to substitute her own interpretation for that made by this Commission in Spahr 2008.” It continues to discuss the fact that pastoral care and marriage are two different things in the Book of Order and they are to be considered separately. They say “Descriptions of pastoral care found in the Directory of Worship do not reach to the question of marriage.” It concludes by pointing out:

The appropriate way to redefine marriage and permissible practice within the PC(USA) is not through individual reinterpretation of the advice of the larger church, but by means of an amendment to the Constitution approved by the
General Assembly and ratified by the presbyteries of the church.

The first of the two dissents, signed by six commissioners, begins by saying that the majority decision is at odds with the PC(USA) constitution talking about the “equality and rights of all people.” It then talks about how we got here:

Both parties agree that before the 2008 Spahr decision there was no limitation on the conduct of teaching elders (clergy) regarding how they approached the matter of gay marriage, although most of the denomination hesitated to perform same gender marriages.

It goes on to say:

The larger church has repeatedly declined to amend W-4.9001 with regard to same-sex ceremonies. The church needs a sharper degree of clarification and guidance that precisely defines how it understands marriage, especially in light of the high financial and personal burden involved. Given the contention regarding the nature and practice of Christian marriage in our time, it would be important and valuable for the Church, through its General Assembly, to state its definition in clearer and more precise legislation.

and concludes with

Since the Directory for Worship is part of our constitution and the majority has found that it may give rise to disciplinary cases, then it should be immediately amended to clearly state that we fully welcome the LGBT community into their rightful place in our church, including allowing them to marry.

Overall, this is the one section that argues most strongly that the strict definition of marriage in W-4.9001 is wrong on equality and justice grounds. Some may see this as the natural linkage of the church’s stand for equality and justice while others will see it as advocacy beyond the the prevue of a PJC decision and possibly even judicial activism.

In reading this I do have trouble with their argument in the second section I quoted.  I think many in the church would argue that when the larger church has “repeatedly declined to amend W-4.9001 with regard to same-sex ceremonies” that does indeed provide a sharp “degree of clarification and guidance.” As for the GA stating its definition in clearer and more precise language, I refer you to the report to the 219th GA of the Special Committee to Study Issues of Civil Unions and Christian Marriage where it says (p. 13):

What is the place of covenanted same-gender partnerships in the Christian community? The members of the PC(USA) cannot agree.

However, having said that, I will agree that while we will have trouble agreeing on a definition of marriage in an ecclesiastical sense, the PC(USA) Constitutional definition would be enhanced by a recognition that in a civil sense that reality is no longer always “one man and one woman.”

Five of those six commissioners on the first dissent continue on in the second dissent concerning the interpretation of the Directory for Worship. They begin:

The majority judges this case primarily in relation to the decisions in Spahr (2008) and Southard (2011) in a conviction that, behind its judicial interpretation, there is in the Constitution an explicit basis against officiating in a same-sex marriage. In fact, this conviction rests upon an assumption rather than explicit constitutional rule. It is grounded principally upon one section, even one sentence, in the Directory of Worship, that is claimed to have clear and obvious legal status. The Commission assumes here and in earlier cases that W-4.9001 presents a legal basis for denying the permissibility and validity of same-sex marriage because it presents a “definition” of marriage as exclusively between a man and a woman. This assumption is flawed. This provision in the Directory of Worship cannot serve effectively as a judicial criterion.

They then argue that W-4.9001 reflects a different point in time when “The exclusive conventional norm was heterosexual marriage, when same-sex marriage, either civil or ecclesiastical, was unimaginable.”  They go on to argue that this section is introductory and narrative and that “To claim that this paragraph is primarily and intentionally legal in nature forces an artificial warp upon its evident narrative purpose.” Finally, they point out that grammatically the primary emphasis of the one sentence is the covenant nature of marriage and not the “one man and one woman.” The dissent concludes:

In this case and the other recent decisions, my principal concern is that this Commission has forged a standard upon an extremely fragile provision, employing a strained interpretation that does not provide the necessary legal foundation for resolution of our dilemma or foster pastoral guidance in the life of the church. By relying so heavily on W-4.9001, the Commission has ruled upon convention rather than law.

I enjoyed reading this dissent and even if you don’t agree with their conclusion if you want to read a well presented argument against the prescriptive nature of this section of the Directory for Worship have a look at it.

So, at this point the Rev. Spahr has reached her final appeal and will be subject to Rebuke by the Presbytery of the Redwoods. However, according to the L.A. Times article she has said that she will continue preforming same-sex marriages. (Although, at the moment they are not permitted in California.)

But getting back to polity questions, what does all this mean? Considering the number of statements that have been made and the wide variety of overtures that are headed to the 220th General Assembly this decision could have significant implications. And that my fellow polity wonks I will take up in Part 2.