Last Friday on NPR‘s All Things Considered news show there was an interesting piece in their Planet Money segment on “Why Airlines Keep Going Bankrupt.” In that report the following lines got me thinking:

(Reporter) CAITLIN KENNEY: …[A]ll airlines face these challenges and only some file for bankruptcy. He says it’s usually a certain type.

(Interviewed expert) PROFESSOR SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: The legacy airlines.

So my thinking made the jump –

“All churches face challenges and only some are in steep decline: The mainline churches.”

Is there a parallel or model in here?  I am still not sure, but permit me to riff on this a bit.

The story discussed how the legacy airlines had price structures and business models that date from before 1978 when the airline industry was deregulated. After deregulation they could not change rapidly enough to compete with the new low-cost carriers that sprung up and the legacy airlines were driven into bankruptcy, sometimes twice. What did bankruptcy get them?

KENNEY: And that’s where bankruptcy comes in. When you see a
bankruptcy, think of it as an airline saying we want to renegotiate our
contracts so we can be more like newer airlines. James Sprayregen is a
partner at the law firm Kirkland and Ellis. He’s worked on the
bankruptcies of United Airlines and TWA.

JAMES
SPRAYREGEN: Those contracts, albeit amended, you know, dozens and
probably hundreds of times, they sort of grew on themselves almost like a
coral reef. And a lot of inefficiencies got built into those.

KENNEY: In bankruptcy, work rules change, vacation days go away, pensions and benefits get reduced.

SPRAYREGEN: Unfortunately, bankruptcy is all about breaking promises.

KENNEY: Breaking those promises means the legacy airlines are going to start to look a lot like the newer airlines.

So, let’s break this down a little bit…

The concept of deregulation is an interesting one to consider for denominational dynamics. When the mainline membership peaked in the 1960’s the mainline was pretty close to a de facto established church. Then society changed and the mainline church, and churches in general, lost their cultural and social status and the decline began. Norms were not the same regarding the mainline churches and more flexibility and variability were introduced into society’s church-going habits. As I pondered this change that might reflect a sort of “deregulation” in the American religious landscape two things came to mind that might be indicators and results of this change.

The first is the, shall we say, change in stability of the American Presbyterian mainline. Following the division in the 1930’s related to the Fundamentalist/Modernist debate, the branches of the Presbyterian mainline enjoyed a period of relative tranquility that was marked by unions and not by divisions. Following the 1960’s the controversies heated up again with the formation of the Presbyterian Church in America from the southern branch in 1973 and the Evangelical Presbyterian Church from the northern branch in 1981, and other rearrangements continuing to the present. (Check out the chart of the American Presbyterian branches.)

The second development I thought might be indicative of a denominational deregulation is the external influence of non-denominational churches and particularly megachurches. With the loss of influence, authority and loyalty to denominations in general, and the mainline in particular, independent or loosely affiliated churches grew. Note the similarities in timing discussed in this article by Scott Thumma (written around 1996):

 Nearly all current megachurches were founded after 1955. The explosive
growth experienced by these congregations, however, did not begin in
earnest until the decade of the eighties (Vaughan 1993:50-51). The 1990’s have not slowed this growth. Data collected in 1992 revealed over 350 such congregations (Thumma 1993b).
Vaughan estimates that the number of megachurches grows by 5 percent
each year (1993:40-41). Given this rate over two million persons will
be weekly attendees of megachurches in the United States by the start
of the new millennium. Anyone familiar with the American religious
scene cannot help but have noticed the rapid proliferation of these
massive congregations. In fact, it is precisely their size which
attracts so much attention.

OK, so in this model we have a societal change that results in a sort of deregulation of the denominational, and particularly the mainline, landscape. This deregulation resulted in both internal and interdenominational changes. And like the airlines the churches are in a position that they can not change fast enough to stay competitive. (old inefficient airplanes –> old inefficient buildings?)

In the story the thing really inhibiting the legacy airlines are the labor agreements. For the churches, what would be our “labor agreements” that have built up over time and keep us from being able to transform into the new reality?

• Our polity? Does nFOG solve this for the PC(USA)?
• Our structure? Will the MGB Comm be able to solve this? How about the Special Committee on the Nature of the Church for the 21st Century?
• Our leadership? Not enough creative thinkers or not enough with a good perspective on youth?

I could go on naming elephants in the room and sacred cows and I’m sure you can think of things that I would not.  The point is that there are lots and lots of things which are being mentioned that are keeping a mainline church pointed in the same direction and there is usually someone that thinks that changing that thing will allow the church to, forgive me for using the business term, be more competitive.

Let me step back for a moment here and affirm that there are certain things that are needed for a business and likewise for a church. These can be modified and adapted but not all together dispensed with. To take the analogy to possibly an absurd level of detail, just as an airline needs planes a denomination needs congregations, and as a plane needs a pilot a church needs a pastor. The question is not do we need a plane, but what plane works best in a particular situation? A pilot needs to be trained, but how much and what kind of training for that plane and that situation? Similarly, the “business model” for a denomination does not require every congregation look the same and every pastor have identical training.

If you would permit me a short detour on this theme: Taking a cue from the airline industry, maybe churches need “type certification.” In the airline industry the basic educational requirement for pilots is very similar.  If all you want to do is train to be a air transport pilot you can do it in about 6 months for $60,000. But whenever you switch aircraft types you need to be trained and certified on that specific aircraft. Just because you fly a 737 does not mean you can sit down in a 747 and properly fly it. So, could the church have a basic fast-track training program for pastoral leadership and then a more customized extension for the specific situation the individual is going into? For the PC(USA) there is already an interim pastor training program that does something like this. (Although it is an extension, not a replacement, of the standard course of study.)  And yes, this is a very general proposal and actually off-topic for this post, but maybe something for continued contemplation.

Returning to the original riff – Let’s move on to the most loaded and divisive question in this model: What would the equivalent action be for a mainline church to reorganize like a company would reorganize in bankruptcy?

Let me put it a different way: What does the mainline church need to get out of to continue on as a viable entity? Or to use the language quoted above – What promises does the mainline church need to break to become the church for the 21st century?

Note carefully the model — this is not working around the edges or tweaking a few programs. This is noting one or two really big things that you then throw out and begin over again. This is the opportunity to deal with that one thing that is holding you back and replace it with something you can work with.  Yes it is radical, but in this model, that is what the legacy airlines have to do to remain viable.

So what is it? Maybe the polity? The structure? The ecclesialogy? The theology?  I don’t know and I’m not going to suggest anything specific here. The question for thought and discussion, if you accept this model, is what items are peripheral to our core business of being Presbyterian and Reformed, of “Glorifying God and Enjoying God Forever,” of preaching the Word, administering the Sacraments and upholding Discipline, that we can dispense with at whatever cost? If we said “no more Mr. Nice Guy,” what would you do to change the church?

Now, maybe I am completely off base with this – I am more than ready to accept that conclusion. I am simply extending the historical development of one industry to a completely different realm. I can easily be convinced that the model I have put forward here is way too superficial and general and that comparing the airline industry to the Christian Church is not fair to either. I am cautious that what I have done is forced the analogy, making something fit where no correspondence is deserved.

So there I end the thought experiment, at least for the moment in this form. I will say that enough of the analogies work in my own mind that I don’t plan on stopping to think about it – but I won’t promise any written follow up. However, in this time of rethinking everything about the mainline churches I thought it might be an interesting model to put out there.  Thanks for thinking it through with me.  Your mileage may vary.

Now, where did I put that court decision…

[After thinking about this over the past weekend I was interested to see that on Monday Pastor Questor reposted a similar sort of model, but comparing the mainline to the American auto industry.]