The publication Tuesday of the decision in the General Assembly Permanent Judicial Commission case 218-12, Jane Adams Spahr v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) through the Presbytery of Redwoods has had a variety of reactions.  Early popular media articles, like this Reuters article or this WHAM-TV piece, basically picked up the story that the Rev. Spahr was cleared of the charges against her.

However, as the day went on the sophistication of the popular media reporting increased and is catching up with the discerning comments of Presbyterians familiar with the issues.  Among the first out with a story was the Presbyterian News Service whose article referred to the decision as “complicated.”  In a statement about the decision the Acting Executive Presbyter/Stated Clerk of Redwood Presbytery, the Rev. Robert Conover, refers to the decision as “nuanced and lengthy.”  In her own statement, the Rev. Spahr expresses her gratitude for the GA PJC upholding the original decision by the Presbytery PJC.  Later articles, such as one by the San Francisco Chronicle, began to recognize that Rev. Spahr’s acquittal is only the easy part of the story and there is still more there. The Chronicle writes “The ambivalent ruling –
affirming the rights of gays and lesbians to have their relationships
sanctioned by the church but not considering them equal to those of
heterosexual couples – is likely to disappoint both sides in the debate.”  And on the KGO-TV web site they write “Tuesday’s ruling is a complicated, split decision. It essentially
clears Reverend Spahr of disciplinary charges, saying she can’t be
found guilty of doing that, which by definition, cannot be done — the
marriage of gay couples. However, they say no one should try it again.”

As for official reaction, the Office of the Stated Clerk on Tuesday updated the Advisory Opinion 7 on Ceremonies Blessing Same-Sex Relationships to reflect this new decision.

Reaction from the web and blogosphere is still developing.  Most progressive web sites that have posted something, like That All May Freely Serve and JustPresbys, are pretty much linking to or quoting other statements or reports.  In the next few days we are likely to see more official statements from these groups.  On his blog the Rev. Ray Bagnuolo recognizes this as a victory, but only a beginning for the cause of equality for LGBT individuals.  Finally, the Rev. John Shuck and the Rev. David Fischler on each of their respective blogs from very different ends of the theological spectrum call this an “odd” and “bazaar” decision.

After reading it through a few times I must agree with them.  After putting together the available pieces, it seems to me that this was a divided PJC and they made the effort to put together a central kernel that they could all affirm and then five of the twelve commission members put together a dissent to the other significant part of the decision.  In addition, there are three other concurring decisions that comment on other parts of the decision.

The real focal point of this decision is Specification of Error No. 1 and No. 2.  Error 1 is that the Synod PJC should not have concluded that same sex marriages are prohibited by Presbyterian polity and Error 2 is that Rev. Spahr committed a disciplinary offense.  The GA PJC recognized that the Book of Order in W-4.9001 and the 1991 Authoritative Interpretation (see Advisory Opinion 7) prohibit ceremonies that represent marriages between persons of the same sex but other commitment or blessing ceremonies are not prohibited.  They also cited that marriage is between a man and a women as stated in W-4.9001.  It would then appear that all of the members of the PJC agreed on the following statements:

The ceremonies that are the subject of this case were not marriages as the term is defined by W-4.9001. These were ceremonies between women, not between a man and a woman. Both parties acknowledged the ceremonies in question were not marriages as defined by the Book of Order.

The SPJC found Spahr guilty of doing that which by definition cannot be done. One cannot characterize same sex ceremonies as marriages for the purpose of disciplining a minister of the Word and Sacrament and at the same time declare that such ceremonies are not marriages for legal or ecclesiastical purposes.

The PPJC was correct in finding that by performing the two ceremonies at issue, Spahr did not commit an offense as charged. Therefore, the SPJC erred in determining that Spahr was guilty of violating W-4.9001 or the 1991 AI.

And at the end of the section the decision says:

In summary, Specification of Error No. 1 is not sustained because by definition, “marriage is . . . between a man and a woman.” (W-4.9001) Specification of Error No. 1 and Specification of Error No. 2 are sustained because W-4.9001 does not state a mandatory prohibition on performing a same sex ceremony. The charge was for performing a marriage ceremony, which by definition cannot be performed.

So, if I read this correctly the question is not whether you intend to conduct a ceremony that you are calling a marriage or view as being equivalent.  The question is whether you did conduct a marriage ceremony.  Since same-sex couples, by definition of W-4.9001, can not be in a relationship called marriage, it is impossible to conduct such a ceremony and therefor no charges can be filed.  (And it appears that by this logic can never be filed.) So “poof,” under PC(USA) polity there is now no such thing as same-sex marriage.

As I look at this decision, this seems to be the mental gymnastics that were necessary to get a unanimous decision.  In addition, the sentence “Both parties acknowledged the ceremonies in question were not marriages as defined by the Book of Order” appears to be carefully constructed to be conditional on the Book of Order definition because it is made clear in the history of the case that Rev. Spahr intended these to be marriages and the evidence includes the fact that she signed a “Certificate of Marriage” in each case.  Even now, in her statement following the decision, she consistently uses the term “marriage” to describe her ministry.

But if you look at the substantive parts quoted above the real emphasis is on Book of Order W-4.9001.  The dissenting opinion by five of the members of the commission takes issue with the additional verbiage in this section that tries to expand on W-4.9001 using the 1991 AI or a previous PJC decision.  W-4.9001 talks about marriage and always refers to it being between a man and a woman.  There is no reference to the ceremony itself in this section or to any other ceremonies that may be for same-sex couples.  Strictly the constitution does not prohibit or regulate same-sex ceremonies except to say they are not marriages.   The 1991 AI and the previous Benton decision do make reference to the ceremony, that it should not be the same as a marriage ceremony and that it would be improper to use the church for such a ceremony.  This decision in the Spahr case extends this by saying:

The five members of the commission who signed the dissent take issue with this extension.  They argue:

In rendering its decision, the majority has taken the liberty of legislating in the guise of interpreting inconsistencies between W-4.9001 on the one hand, and the 1991 Al and this Commission’s decision in Benton v. Presbytery of Hudson River, Remedial Case 212-11 (2000), on the other hand. For the reasons stated herein, we respectfully concur in the result of the majority, but disagree with the decision of the majority to the extent that it rests on the 1991 AI or Benton.

This seems to hearken back to the recent GA PJC decisions on the 2006 AI concerning declarations of exceptions in ordinations.  The idea is that the constitution is primary and AI’s and PJC decisions should not be used to extend the reach of the constitution.

On the other side, three commissioners in a concurring opinion write, in total:

We join in the foregoing Decision and Order (Decision). We understand the Decision to be an authoritative interpretation of W-4.9001, to mea
n that officers of the PCUSA who are authorized to perform marriages shall not hereafter perform a same sex union ceremony in which or with respect to which such officer states, implies or represents to be a marriage or the equivalent thereof. While the Commission did not find Spahr guilty as charged herein, in part because her conduct occurred under prior authoritative interpretations, we understand that future noncompliance with the authoritative interpretation of the Decision will be considered to be a disciplinable offense.

So, now that it is in the books, you have been warned and don’t do it again.

For the polity wonks, an interesting polity point is that the GA PJC dismissed arguments base on Benton right from the start of the decision in the Preliminary Statement pointing out that Benton resulted from a remedial case and this was a disciplinary case so it was not relevant case law.  With the exception of reference to it in the dissent I have not found other reference to Benton in the rest of the decision section.

In the reasoning on Errors 1 and 2 the main opinion continues on for roughly another page discussing Rev. Spahr’s ministry and the part of marriage ceremonies in it.  It acknowledges her sense of call to “participate in a caring and compassionate ministry to persons who have been marginalized, who are faithful Christians, and who wish to be accepted in every way as full members of the body of Christ.”  It also says that the Rev. Spahr may consider herself acting in the role of a prophet to the church, and points out that the role of a prophet contains risks and carries consequences.  The decision goes on to say “It is the burden of a church officer to accept the consequences of his or her actions that are the ecclesiastical equivalent of civil disobedience.”  The third of the concurring opinions expands on this and the Book of Order basis for it, even further.

The rest of the decision is fairly routine, procedural, and straight-forward.  Most errors were rendered irrelevant once Rev. Spahr was cleared in the first section.  It was noted that for Error 3 there was no disciplinary action to be taken, but originally the Synod PJC was out of place imposing a punishment and it should have remanded the case back to the Presbytery PJC for the consequences.  And it noted that while Rev. Spahr on appeal had referred to the 2006 AI, that was irrelevant because that applied only to conscience issues related to ordination standards.  Error 6 also refers back to conscience but the decision replys “Submission to the current standards of the church may not always be comfortable, but it is not optional.”  Finally, Error 7 was about a member of the Presbytery PJC and whether they should have been disqualified from serving on the case.  The decision says it was correct to let them go ahead and serve but a concurring opinion says that while it may be procedurally correct, for the appearance of a fair decision disqualification would have been wise.

So that is the decision, but where does that leave us?  As one statement said, this seems to imply a “separate but equal” structure in the PC(USA).  The ceremonies just can not look the same.  Rev. Spahr says that she will continue conducting “marriages.”  It also seems like muddled case law that neither side in the debate will be comfortable with.  It seems ripe for clarification and expansion by a future GA PJC.  And the similar case of the Rev. Janet Edwards in Pittsburgh Presbytery is awaiting a trial date.  It will be interesting to see how this as case law influences that decision.