Category Archives: PJC decision

Threading The Needle — SPJC Approves Standards Statement

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No sooner do I get done reflecting on the tension between a presbytery having full authority to determine if candidates hold the necessary and essential tenets of the Reformed faith and the requirement that presbyteries don’t actually try to enumerate them in advance then we have a Synod Permanent Judicial Commission (SPJC) decision that confirms that a presbytery has appropriately threaded this needle.

This case goes back to last September when the Presbytery of Los Ranchos adopted a statement on “behavioral expectations” of officers. This statement reads

Affirming that ‘The gospel leads members to extend the fellowship of Christ to all persons.’ (G-1.0302) The Presbytery of Los Ranchos, meeting on September 15, 2011, affirms that the Bible, The Book of Confessions and the Book of Order (including G-2.0104b and G- 2.0105.1 & 2) set forth the scriptural and constitutional standards for ordination and installation. Los Ranchos Presbytery believes the manner of life of ordained Ministers should be a demonstration of the Christian gospel in the church and in the world, including living either in fidelity within the covenant of marriage between a man and a woman or chastity in singleness and will so notify candidates for ordination/installation and/or membership in the presbytery. In obedience to Jesus Christ, under the authority of Scripture and guided by our confessions, this presbytery will prayerfully and pastorally examine each candidate’s calling, gifts, preparation, and suitability for the responsibilities of office, including a commitment to fulfill all requirements as expressed in the constitutional questions of ordination and installation.

A remedial complaint was filed with the Synod of Southern California and Hawaii PJC – Gerald J . Larson, Gary L. Collins, Rebecca B. Prichard , R. Winston Presnall, Margery Mcintosh, Michal Vaughn, Lucy Stafford-Lewis, July Richwine, Jerry Elliott, Sara McCurdy, Gregory Vacca, Gail Stearns, Steve Wirth, Suzanne Darweesh, Jane Parker , Darlene Elliott, Frances Bucklin, Deborah Mayhew, James McCurdy, Judith Anderson, and Susan Currie, Complainants, vs . Presbytery of Los Ranchos, Respondent (with thanks to the Layman for making the decision available on-line). The complainants had three Specifications of Error which the SPJC wrote “can be disposed of by the following specification: Whether a presbytery has the right to pass a resolution concerning the manner of life for its teaching elders as part of the proper exercise of the presbytery’s authority within the powers reserved to presbyteries . (F-3.0209)” And the decision says – “This specification is answered in the affirmative.”

In stating that the resolution is proper the key line in the decision section says

It does not restate the Constitution in that it explicitly affirms the various documents without offering an interpretation of those documents.

They go on to first note that prior GAPJC decisions are based upon a prior Book of Order, although it is worth mentioning that the Report of the Special Committee on Existing Authoritative Interpretations of the Book of Order is recommending that all the cited Interpretations be retained. The decision then discusses these standards in light of the Bush and Buescher GAPJC decisions. Relative to Bush v Pittsburgh (218-10) they note that the Los Ranchos statement is in compliance with that decision as the “Resolution does not seek to offer an interpretation, paraphrase or restatement of any constitutional provisions.” Regarding the Buescher v Olympia decision (218-09) the Los Ranchos resolution specifically says that each candidate will be individually examined and so it does not have essentials that are mandated in advance.

Then, in what strikes me as an interesting use of this section of the Book of Order, the decision cites F-3.0102 where it says “[E]very Christian church, or union or association of particular churches, is entitled to declare the terms of admission into its communion, and the qualifications of its ministers and members…” I have usually read this in the context of affirming denominational differences not standards for individual presbyteries or particular churches so its use here struck me as out of place. Just my reading of it and I’ve grasped at thinner straws myself.

The decision section concludes with this:

The Resolution does not obstruct any on-going interpretation or implementation of the constitution. It does not alter or interpret the standards for ordination and installation. The Resolution does not seek to define any tenet as an ‘essential’ doctrine of the P.C. (U.S.A.).

But the SPJC has more to say in the order, and while lifting the Stay of Enforcement the Presbytery was also, under order, admonished for the language that they chose:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Presbytery of Los Ranchos be admonished that while this PJC considers the resolution constitutional, the use of specific language known to be divisive and inflammatory flies in the face of the responsibility to seek the peace, unity, and purity of the church.

Now, the polity wonks probably picked up two items in the decision that seem a bit of an issue, one being the use of F-3.0102 that I just mentioned. Two commissioners dissented from the decision and highlighted these two items in their opinion. Their first point is this:

1. In using the statement, “living either in fidelity within the covenant of marriage between a man and a woman or in singleness” the Presbytery is using a direct restating of the previous Book of Order requirement which was replaced by the General Assembly action and the presbyteries’ vote. Therefore, it has no constitutional standing and cannot be used to determine a candidate’s ordination eligibility. Such a policy preempts the vote of presbyters meeting in the future for the examination of candidates who have met the current constitutional requirements.

They later write:

This language is purposefully taken out of the standards for ordained service (G-2.0l04b) by the action of the General Assembly and vote of the presbyteries. This renders the statement of the Presbytery of Los Ranchos unconstitutional in form and intent.

Their second point is what they consider the misapplication of F-3.0102 by the majority. Expressing the same understanding of the section I mention above they write, in part:

In F-3.0102 the Book of Order continues to speak of the Christian church [in all its denominations] by saying, “Every Christian Church or union or association of particular churches”[referring to denominations, not presbyteries] is entitled to declare the terms of admission into its communion, and the qualifications of its ministers and members. [Again, referring Reformed Tradition churches, not presbyteries.]

In fact, the Presbyterian Church (USA) specifically stresses in diversity as it states in the Book of Order: (F-1.0403)

The unity of believers in Christ is reflected in the rich diversity of the Church’s membership…

Let me make two brief points in conclusion:

First, the Presbytery of Los Ranchos is trying to walk a very fine polity line here and in the opinion of the majority of the SPJC they have successfully done so.  However, the decision I expected from this case was much, much closer to the dissenting opinion. I have to think that the verbatim inclusion of now-removed language from the Book of Order is a problem in light of the Bush decision. If appealed to the GAPJC I would think this decision has a high likelihood of being overturned. However…

Before the GAPJC will be able to hear this case, if appealed, the 220th General Assembly will be meeting and who knows what polity landscape will come out of that.  One possibility is that an Overture from South Alabama Presbytery (Item 07-08) will be sent to the presbyteries for concurrence providing for presbytery-specific behavioral expectations to be included in the presbytery’s operational manuals. Or maybe officers-elect who are being examined will be explicitly prohibited from being asked to commit on how they would view the fitness of future officers-elect they might be examining. This request for an AI comes from similar overtures from Genesee Valley and Albany.

Finally, just a reminder and in full disclosure that I am, and have been, active in the Synod of Southern California and Hawaii and know a good number of the people on both sides of this issue. The opinions expressed here are my own and do not reflect any sort of official disagreement or agreement with the faithful members of the SPJC. These are purely personal conclusions and remarks.

So, like much in the PC(USA) at the moment the future developments in this case will be interesting to see and heavily influenced by the moving target that is PC(USA) polity at the moment. Stay tuned and we will see what happens.

PC(USA) GAPJC Decision — Parnell v. Presbytery of San Francisco

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The Permanent Judicial Commission of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) has heard the final installment in a series of cases concerning San Francisco Presbytery’s decision to ordain Lisa Larges as a teaching elder. This has been a long journey which has finally reached its conclusion — this decision lifts the stay of enforcement and clears the way for the Presbytery’s decision to ordain Lisa to be carried out. In the larger context with the passage of Amendment 10-A we have probably seen the last of this type of cases.

I am not going to go through the full, complicated history of this case and the other remedial cases revolving around this ordination process – you can read about it in the GAPJC decision and my previous summaries. Briefly, where we stand with this case is that in the previous hearing before the GAPJC the Commission agreed with the Synod PJC that for the most part the procedure followed by the Presbytery was correct but that in their decision the Synod PJC had not properly dealt with the issue of doctrine. It was remanded back to the Synod for further consideration and now following that consideration, and an SPJC decision that there was no problem, it was appealed back to the GAPJC.

Now, in the case of Eric Parnell, Bruce McIntosh, Cordelia Shieh, Margaret Gelini, Greg Roth, Marsha Roth, Randy Young, and the Session of Walnut Creek Presbyterian Church, Appellants (Complainants), v. Presbytery of San Francisco, Appellee (Respondent):  Remedial Case 220-10 the GAPJC in a unanimous decision did not sustain any of the eight specifications of error.  As I indicated above every one dealt with doctrine and all begin “The SPJC committed an error of constitutional interpretation when it…” These specifications of error are:

  • “…when it failed to act according to its constitutional responsibility to warn and bear witness against error in doctrine within its bounds.”
  • “…when it presumed that it was the presbytery’s prerogative to determine the essentials of Reformed faith and polity, when they are expressed in the Constitution.”
  • “…when it failed to properly reconcile the Historic Principles of Church Order by giving effect only to F-3.0101 (Freedom of Conscience) at the expense of all the others.”
  • “…when it applied the concept of mutual forbearance (F-3.0105) to permit the candidate’s conscientious objection to a scriptural and confessional standard to infringe upon the rights and views of others (G-2.0105).”
  • “…when it failed to apply and enforce the interpretation of Scripture found in the Confessions (G-2.0105) with regard to sexual conduct.”
  • “…when it failed to discipline and rebuke the Presbytery for its failure to admonish and instruct the candidate in correct doctrine (G-3.0301c).”
  • “…when it permitted the Presbytery to accept a candidate for ordination who could not, by her rejection of sound doctrine, provide an affirmative answer to each of the constitutional questions for ordination (W-4.4003, 4005b, 4006b).”
  • “…when it permitted mere authoritative interpretations – in this case, the PUP and Knox AI – to override constitutional provisions, including those found in the Book of Confessions.”

As polity wonks know, every one of these has been an important polity question in the Presbyterian understanding of church government. In this present case some of these are rendered moot by the change in the Book of Order removing the specific restrictive language. But others are more general, such as how free a presbytery is to decide essentials of Reformed Faith and polity or the interplay of mutual forbearance, conscientious objection and confessional standards.  I’ll make a couple of observations in a minute, but first some quotes from the decision itself.

In the opening paragraph of the decision section the GAPJC writes:

[The] alleged errors can be subsumed under two categories: (1) doctrinal error by errant interpretation of Scripture and Confessions, and (2) the authority of the Presbytery in the examination of the Candidate for ordination. The Commission agrees with the SPJC Decision that the Presbytery properly exercised its prerogative in determining that the Candidate did not depart from the essentials of Reformed faith and polity.

They note the “diversity of opinions” in the PC(USA) and that historically “presbyteries have had full authority to determine whether a candidate for ordination adheres to the necessary and essential tenets of the Reformed faith.” The decision section concludes by talking about the Book of Confessions:

The Book of Confessions reflects that the Church listens to a multitude of voices in shaping its beliefs. The Book of Confessions is hardly univocal, containing as it does eleven different creeds, catechisms, and confessions of faith written over millennia of Christian witness. … Therefore, the confessional tradition is, itself, an instrument of reform. The Book of Confessions, much like Scripture itself, requires discernment and interpretation when its standards are to be applied in the life and mission of the church.

The decision of the SPJC is therefore affirmed and the stay of enforcement vacated.

This decision comes with two concurring opinions from two different viewpoints.  The first, signed by four commissioners, is an interesting historical commentary. It begins by noting that the original examination of the candidate involved declaring a scruple which they “believe to have then been unconstitutional.” With the change in the constitutional language this is no longer relevant.

But they go on to note, using language from the SPJC decision, the “vast diversity of interpretation of scripture and the confessions regarding human sexuality” across members of the denomination. They then write:

While we concur with this assessment of where the PC(USA) is as a denomination, we lament that it is in this place – where differences over matters of human sexuality have become so diverse and divisive, where slim majority votes create huge shifts in the communal life of the denomination, and where every decision the church makes in this area is a sweet victory for one side, and a bitter defeat for the other, ultimately causing entire congregations to determine that they can no longer remain in fellowship with the denomination. As Joe Small described in a recent article in First Things, our denomination has relied on polity instead of scriptural and theological discernment to decide particular manifestations of the dilemma in which we find ourselves.

In many respects the denomination has been transformed by a culture of sexual fixation rather than being transformative of that culture. What difference does it make to be “Christian” when it comes to our lifestyles? Have we spoken truth to power on issues such as promiscuity, premarital, extramarital and postmarital sex and the “soft” pornography that is rampant in our television shows and advertisements? Have we been willing to teach our children and each other on these matters? Or have we succumbed to the tyranny of cultural peer pressure? How can we discipline officers for sexual misconduct when we are unwilling to discipline ourselves generally? Have we been blinded by the “trees” of the homosexual issue, while overlooking the “forest” of the larger issues of sexual gluttony generally?

They continue with an interesting comparison of the situation today with the circumstances in the 1920’s that gave rise to the Swearingen Commission. They quote from the Commission’s first report that discussed the lack of interest in changing the Constitution but rather that “They are agreed that the remedies for our troubles are within the Constitution itself.” The opinion then goes on to say:

The same assessment could not be given today, and it is precisely our arguments over the constitution – including acts of outright defiance of constitutional provisions by those on both “sides” in our various debates – that we believe threaten our continued existence and future vitality as a faith tradition. There was a time when our covenantal commitment to each other was strong, and when “mutual forbearance” meant a willingness to abide by our constitution even as we worked to change it. Because of our increasing differences regarding what the constitution ought to say, those days are gone – and we are therefore in the position described by the Swearingen Commission in which our difficulties are “multiplied greatly.”

There is a second concurring opinion by two commissioners that makes an argument about the place of interpretation. They begin by noting that “the matter of interpretation is central because in large part it is inevitable within scriptural and confessional authority.” They go on to write:

The necessary act of interpretation has been at the heart of the Reformed tradition from its inception. One may, in fact, claim that the Reformation in itself was an event of radical reinterpretation, i.e., a corrected interpretation of the Bible in a recovery of the priority of the Gospel of Jesus Christ and the means of grace.

They continue:

In this case, the parties agree on the necessity of continuing interpretation in understanding the meaning of Scripture and Confession through the application of modern textual analysis. The record exhibits testimony and general agreement in a number of interpretive conflicts in the church’s more recent history dealing with issues such as the role of women in the church, or in the matter of divorce and remarriage. The use of textual-critical methods, especially in the last century, has altered the range of interpretation to such an extent that scriptural and confessional texts in the arena of social and sexual relations areas have become open to alternate understandings.

Only in the matter of homosexuality do the Appellants claim an exception, i.e., pressing a univocal meaning and interpretation across vastly different historical periods and socio-cultural contexts. Although in other areas of contention there is an acceptance of the conditioning nature of radically altered historical-cultural situations, including differing social and scientific assessments, that may lead to the legitimacy of variant interpretation, in the argument of this Appeal homosexuality is an exception. It alone is held to be exempt from such interpretive analysis. The Appellants do not offer a convincing rationale in support of this exception. There is extended reference to a simple preponderance of pre-modern and early modern testimonies, but the argument remains rooted in an assumption of univocal constancy, with little reference to contemporary critical analysis or contextual differentiation. Absent such substantiation, the Appellants present no basis for rejecting the truth claim in variant interpretations.

The opinion concludes with how the Swearingen Commission described an essential tenet in their second report:

That which is “essential and necessary” is that which must be present in the doctrinal system of the church in order to uphold its central witness and maintain its distinctive character. Absent such doctrine, the system collapses. The test then becomes whether a particular doctrine or practice is necessary for the integrity of the system of doctrine as a whole.

They conclude that the doctrinal issue in this matter does not rise to the level of “essential and necessary.”

Now, while each of these is an interesting commentary and provides insights into the historical context, they are only concurring opinions and are not authoritative. In addition, they are essentially comments on the larger situation in the PC(USA) and how they see that it got into the current circumstances. It is left as an exercise for the reader as to the strengths of each of their arguments.

So, in that vain here are a couple of observations from me that I hope address the implications of this decision…

One of the things that I am on the lookout for when reading PJC or SJC decisions is to what extent they may be setting precedent. Because Amendment 10-A has gone into effect Specification of Error 8 is moot and was not individually addressed so this decision does not help enlighten us on the extent to which a General Assembly may use an Authoritative Interpretation to, shall we say, smooth constitutional language.  The first concurring opinion gave us their belief on the matter. I am concerned that the 220th General Assembly could issue AI’s that will be bouncing back and forth between the GA and the GAPJC much as the PUP and Knox AI did.

One thing this opinion does reinforce is that “presbyteries have had full authority to determine whether a candidate for ordination adheres to the necessary and essential tenets of the Reformed faith.” In doing so the GAPJC again declines to give specific guidance on what those are and leaves it up to the presbyteries. Is the logical extension of this that presbyteries, in discerning the necessary and essential tenets, are empowered to formally establish what necessary and essential tenets are? (exempli gratia) We know from the 2008 Buescher v. Olympia decision:

Attempts by governing bodies that ordain and install officers to adopt resolutions, statements or policies that paraphrase or restate provisions of the Book of Order and/or declare them as “essentials of Reformed faith and polity” are confusing and unnecessary, and are themselves an obstruction to constitutional governance in violation of G-6.0108a.

Candidates must be evaluated individually but if the presbytery has “full authority,” to what extent can the necessary and essential tenets be determined as a matter of presbytery policy?

But while this decision speaks of the full authority of a presbytery and listening to a “multitude of voices,” the polity wonks are well aware of the tension and limits expressed in the Maxwell v. Pittsburgh decision where the GAPJC said that “presbytery’s power is not absolute. It must be exercised in conformity with the Constitution.” They went on to say

It is evident from our Church’s confessional standards that the Church believes the Spirit of God has led us into new understandings of this equality before God, Thus the Confession of 1967 proclaims, “Congregations, individuals, or groups of Christians who exclude, dominate, or patronize their fellowmen, however subtly, resist the Spirit of God and bring contempt on the faith which they profess.” (9.44.)

So a tension is present and over time the confessions may be understood to be more univocal on particular points.

And just a note about how these decisions focus on the church Constitution in general and the confessions in particular.  Yes, it is the charge of the GAPJC to interpret the Constitution, but while the specifications of error made reference to scripture, only passing reference to this is made in this decision to the authority of scripture. The focus instead is on how it is filtered and viewed through the confessions.  Compare this to the charges against Charles A. Briggs in 1893, admittedly a bit apples and oranges since this is remedial and that was disciplinary, which are very specific in regards to scripture references and doctrinal errors. As the Maxwell decision says, the authority of a presbytery is judged in relation to the Constitution, not in direct relation to scripture.

Another point that jumped out at me was the decision’s discussion of the nature of The Book of Confessions.  I don’t think it surprised anyone who has looked at the history of American Presbyterianism to read the line in the decision that says “The Book of Confessions reflects that the Church listens to a multitude of voices in shaping its beliefs. The Book of Confessions is hardly univocal, containing as it does eleven different creeds, catechisms, and confessions of faith written over millennia of Christian witness.” Even with only the Westminster Standards American Presbyterians have had trouble agreeing on what they mean — how much more when you have eight other documents thrown in? In light of the fact that ECO has expressed their desire to be specific about necessary and essential tenets I, and I suspect a number of others, were surprised to see that they propose adopting all eleven of the documents as their subsidiary standards, at least as an opening position.  Recognizing that this variety of statements is not univocal on many doctrinal issues, at the West Coast Fellowship of Presbyterians gathering in March it was interesting to hear TE Jim Singleton, in response to a question about this, commented that there will probably be doctrinal issues to be worked out “once we are all in the boat together” as the new ECO body.

OK, I have rambled on enough here so let me get to the bottom line.  As I read this decision I don’t see that it breaks any new ground but is a confirmation of the current status in the PC(USA). It is significant in two respects: 1) From my tracking all pre-10-A judicial cases have now been concluded. 2) The reinforcing of the status quo comes at a pivotal time with the establishment of ECO and a number of contentious issues coming to the General Assembly in two months. Another milepost on the journey — let us see what happens next.  Stay tuned…

PC(USA) GAPJC Decision — Hwang v. Synod Of Southern California And Hawaii

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Last fall there was an interesting case decided by the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) General Assembly Permanent Judicial Commission that seems to have gotten relatively little notice. One of the interesting features is listed right up front in the decision in the first few words of the Arrival Statement –

This is a remedial case of original jurisdiction…

For those not up to speed on their PJC lingo this is one of those rare instances when the GAPJC is the trial court for a remedial complaint. (And thanks to our Synod EP/Stated Clerk Doska Ross for some history on these cases and they are a roughly once per decade occurrence. It is also useful to note that two similar cases were recently denied by the GAPJC because the claimant did not have standing – 220-06 and 220-07 )

Before we dive into the background of the complaint and the details of the decision I need to give full disclosure and clarification — As many of you know I have been active in the Synod of Southern California and Hawaii (the Synod) for a number of years and as a recent officer of the Synod I have a strong connection to the Respondent in this case and know many of the individuals involved.  However, in my time working with the Synod, while I am familiar with the events that led up to the complaint, I have not been a member of the Administrative Commission that is at the heart of this case and I have not been involved with the day-to-day events the Commission has dealt with. Now, having said that let’s move onward…

At the center of this case is the Hanmi Korean language non-geographic Presbytery. The presbytery was first authorized for ten years by the 195th General Assembly (1983) and organized on January 28, 1984. The 204th General Assembly (1992) granted the request for a fifteen year extension with the instructions for the presbytery and the synod to
“prepare an intentional plan for the transfer of congregations, as they
are ready, to the proper geographic presbytery … .” As the fifteen years were winding down another request for reauthorization was made and the 218th General Assembly (2008) granted the request that Hanmi Presbytery be “continued without term limit.” This was in contrast to the 219th General Assembly (2010) that declined to create a new non-geographic Korean language presbytery elsewhere in the country.

Back in February 1999 the Synod created an Administrative Commission (AC) to take jurisdiction of Hanmi Presbytery and help it work through various problems. The AC is still in place today – that would be 12 of the 28 years the presbytery has been active – and through its history the Synod has modified the AC’s powers and in general has over time reduced its authority with responsibility being transferred back to the Presbytery. In addition, at this time Hanmi has four administrative commissions of its own working with different churches. At a called Synod Assembly meeting on 18 December 2010 the Synod granted the AC some additional authority which became the basis on which this remedial complaint was filed.

The case is Remedial Case 220-05: Steve S. Hwang, Complainant v. Synod of Southern California and Hawaii, Respondent. The GAPJC heard the case almost one year later in October 2011. (The case was tried under the Book of Order in effect at the time of the alleged irregularities but some portions of the decision drift into using current Book of Order citations.)

At the December 2010 meeting the Synod added to the jurisdiction of the AC by:

(i) adding the responsibilities of the Presbytery’s Committee on Ministry (COM) outlined in G-11.0502 a, b, c, and j of the Book of Order, (ii) adding jurisdiction over the administrative commissions previously created by Presbytery, specifically including the Administrative Commission for Torrance First Presbyterian Church (TAC), and (iii) prohibiting the Presbytery and its COM from taking any actions from those designated responsibilities without the prior consent of the SAC.

Through the pre-trial conferences the trial was limited to two specific issues:

(i) Whether on December 18, 2010, the Synod committed an irregularity under G-11.0502 when it added to the jurisdiction of the pre-existing Synod Hanmi Presbytery Administrative Commission by giving the Commission full jurisdiction over the responsibilities of the Presbytery’s Committee on Ministry as outlined in G-11.0502 a, b, c, and j, without giving the Commission complete jurisdiction over the Presbytery itself; and

(ii) Whether on December 18, 2010, the Synod committed an irregularity under G-9.0502 when it gave the pre-existing Synod Hanmi Presbytery Administrative Commission complete jurisdiction over administrative commissions previously constituted by Hanmi Presbytery, including specifically the Administrative Commission for Torrance First Presbyterian Church.

In their decision a majority of the GAPJC did not sustain these complaints and the reasoning was fairly brief and direct. Regarding the first alleged irregularity they write “while it may be questioned whether the Synod wisely allocated G-11.0502 responsibilities between the SAC and the Presbytery, this Commission declines to substitute its judgment for that of the Synod.” They then go on to cite the sections of the Book of Order that as “currently interpreted” permit a synod to take original jurisdiction.

Concerning the second irregularity they say:

As to the second alleged irregularity, it may be questioned whether the Synod should have included the TAC as one of the administrative commissions over which it was taking jurisdiction, since the record is unclear as to whether the TAC existed on December 18, 2010. However, the Synod’s action did not rise to the level of an irregularity since, if the TAC did then exist, the Synod would have had authority to assume jurisdiction over it under G-9.0503…; if it did not then exist, the assertion of authority would have been of no effect.

So there is the core of the decision, but there is a lot more here for us polity wonks to chew on. Let me begin with a bit more of the decision. The GAPJC does note that “the authority to assume original jurisdiction over a lower governing body is not a specifically delegated authority in the Book of Order, except in the case of a presbytery assuming original jurisdiction of a session.” But in rendering their decision they defer to a General Assembly Authoritative Interpretation from 2003 “which listed the assumption of original jurisdiction over a presbytery by a synod as one of the remedies available to the synod if a presbytery within its jurisdiction is not obeying decisions of the General Assembly’s Permanent Judicial Commission.”

But they go on to point out the tension in the Presbyterian system with the presbytery as the basic unit of the system and say

This
Commission lifts up to the church for its consideration the question of whether the 2003
Authoritative Interpretation adequately embodies the principle of F-3.0209 (formerly G-9.0103)
that “the jurisdiction of each council is limited by the express provisions of the Constitution, with
powers not mentioned being reserved to the presbyteries.” While the provision of former G-9.0503a(4) (now G-3.0109b(5)) makes it clear that councils may appoint administrative
commissions to “inquire into and settle the difficulties” in bodies within their jurisdiction, this
Commission suggests that assuming original jurisdiction of a lower body is a matter of such a
serious nature that the authority to do so should be explicitly prescribed in the Book of Order.

But wait, there’s more… This decision also has a concurring opinion, a dissenting opinion and two opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Lot’s of stuff here for polity wonks to chew on.

Two commissioners signed the concurring opinion noting that they concur reluctantly because the issues on trial were so narrowly defined. They go on to say “this case demonstrates the difficulties that can arise when a synod administrative commission assumes original jurisdiction over a troubled presbytery.” For synods working with presbyteries, particularly language-specific ones, they argue that original jurisdiction is an “inadequate and confusing response” and note that with the AC in place the inalienable right of members to chose their leaders has been restricted for a dozen years. They conclude

If a presbytery is so fragile or so conflicted that it cannot govern itself then it should be asked if
the presbytery is viable. If not, the presbytery should be dissolved and its congregations
transferred to other presbyteries. However, a presbytery, having been established, should first be
given a fair opportunity to succeed or fail by its own efforts. The current situation, where a
presbytery is deemed viable but denied self-government, is unworkable. The congregations and
ministers of Hanmi Presbytery deserve better.

The next opinion is concurring in part and dissenting in part and signed by two commissioners with a third agreeing with most of it. Their point is that the Torrance Administrative Commission was properly concluded before the Synod took the action and they conclude “Neither a declaration by the Synod nor a Decision of this Commission can call back into existence an AC which no longer exists.” But along with this they are critical of the AC and the Synod for not being transparent about the facts and possibly even being obstructive. As they write, “it was inappropriate and even misleading for the SAC’s recommendation to have given specific emphasis to the Torrance AC.”

The dissenting opinion was signed by two commissioners and three more signed on to all but the concluding paragraph.  This is a good read for polity wonks as the dissent talks about the nature of Presbyterian government and the relationship of governing bodies. They note that while there is the right of review and control of a higher governing body over a lower one, they argue that “such a reviewing authority does not provide authority for a pro-active taking over of the jurisdiction of a lower governing body.” Combined with the provision that “with powers not mentioned being reserved to the presbyteries” (G-9.0103, now F-3.0208-.0209)” they write in conclusion:

Our constitution has no explicit provision whether a synod can appoint an Administrative Commission to assume the original jurisdiction over a Presbytery. Applying a provision for
Presbytery to Synod is over-reaching interpretation of the Constitution and may not be well
reflected the principle of Presbyterian governing (F-3.0208, F-3.0209). We believe the
empowering of the SAC by the Synod to intervene in the existing Presbytery’s power to govern
its congregations through its committee on ministry and administrative commissions is un-Presbyterian and an erroneous decision and, therefore, the complaints must be sustained.

The final concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion takes issue with the Synod granting to the AC only four of the ten responsibilities of the Committee on Ministry. They argue that to fragment a committee’s responsibilities is disruptive and even if legal with “its threat of disorder it rises to the level of irregularity.” The commissioners argue that the granting the AC the powers of the COM should be all or nothing:

The functions of a Committee on Ministry as outlined in G-11.0502, a-j, are not to be pastorally
or operationally fragmented because its processes and procedures are holistic by nature. The
segregation of selected functions or divided authorization between a committee and a
commission is unwieldy and unnecessary. It fractures the operations of work that is often
pastorally delicate and operationally intricate.

So there you have a run-down of the decision. Several great polity questions in there which the GAPJC had to deal with. Probably the one with the widest future applicability is whether a synod can take original jurisdiction of a troubled presbytery. While the dissenting opinion argued “no” the majority gave a “yes, but…” It is interesting though that while they said it would be helpful to have it explicitly stated in the constitution and they stated that they would not overturn the previous interpretation, to some degree they seem to have expanded that previous interpretation. The AI on 03-04 by the 215th General Assembly dealt specifically with the powers of enforcement when a GAPJC decision was not being complied with. In this case the rational is extended to a synod stepping in to work with a troubled presbytery. (And there have been enough judicial cases in all this to argue that it is in response to one although the decision does not specifically cite any.) (You can see if this link to the AI works. And the report of the Special Committee on Existing Authoritative Interpretation recommends retaining this AI.)

This decision, while reinforcing the status quo, should also cause us to think about the nature of a presbytery and the current expectations for it. Our presbyteries are much more institutional than they were about a century ago and when they don’t function as the institution they are expected to be the question is not what are the legal ways to help them out but what are the best ways to support them. The other side of the coin to this, of course, is asking the question the decision does as to whether presbyteries are being created that are not viable in our current institutional structure.

So the GAPJC decision enhances the strength of connectionalism and higher governing bodies’ powers of review and control. While it would be interesting to see if future cases are helpful in further defining these powers between the rarity of these cases to begin with and the prospect of the re-purposing of synods would seem to make this unlikely.  However, this decision could be relevant to some of the “reflective experimentation” that could come out of the Mid-Councils Commission recommendations if a higher council felt that a presbytery experiment was getting out of hand.  It will be interesting to see if this decision has future implications.  Stay tuned…

PC(USA) Synod PJC Decisions — Per Capita And Property

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For us Presbyterian Polity Wonks this past weekend was a good weekend for interesting PJC decisions. I will say at the onset that both were decided as I expected, but that does not make them any less interesting. And of course the interest and importance is enhanced by the fact that they deal with two of the hot-topics in the PC(USA) today — per capita and property. And the obvious reminder, these are synod PJC decisions so there is no broad application at this stage and as I will discuss I think they both rely on and reinforce current precedent.

If you want an executive summary of these two remedial cases here you go:  The SPJC of the Synod of the Trinity found that changes to the new Form of Government were not substantial in the area of per capita and that Pittsburgh Presbytery could not make a new policy to avoid paying per capita it did not collect. In the second case, the SPJC of the Synod of the Pacific found that San Francisco Presbytery did have the authority under the Book of Order and acted in good faith when it dismissed a church with its property.

Now the details…

Last December Pittsburgh Presbytery
adopted as part of its Manual of Presbytery the line “Presbytery shall only remit to the General Assembly the per capita assessment it receives from the particular churches that is designated by those councils.” In their decision in the trial of this remedial case – David C. Green, Complainant, vs. The Presbytery of Pittsburgh, Respondent – the SPJC of the Synod of the Trinity boils down the argument of the Presbytery and the SPJC’s disagreement with that argument nicely into two paragraphs:

Pittsburgh Presbytery argues that the adoption of the New Form of Government by the 219th (2010) General Assembly set aside the applicable previous decisions of General Assembly, Permanent Judicial Commission and Authoritative Interpretations since the General Assembly “chose not to include the strict construction language from the 1999 Authoritative Interpretation (Request 99-1)”.

We disagree with this argument. The substance of the previous relevant language, now found in G-3.0106, was adopted except for the addition of the clause, “but in no case shall the authority of the Session to direct its benevolences be compromised.” We do not believe the addition of this clause has changed the obligation of presbyteries to remit per capita to synods and General Assembly.

So, at this point the opinion is that the language in the Book of Order has not changed to a substantial degree and previous General Assembly Interpretations still stand. This decision is in agreement with the Report of the Special Committee on Existing Authoritative Interpretations of the Book of Order, released a few days after the SPJC decision, which recommends that Authoritative Interpretation 99-1 be retained. The SPJC decision also discusses GAPJC cases where the same conclusion was reached. They wrap this up by saying “We fully agree with the previous authoritative interpretations.” They then conclude the formal decision itself by noting that not passing on per capita is a “serious breach of trust and love” (Minihan v. Presbytery of Scioto Valley, 216-01) and then applying it to themselves:

If this form of congregational protest were to be passed on to synod and General Assembly by our judicial action, then we would be unconstitutionally encouraging a form of protest that is outside of our understanding of how change can and should be effected within our denomination.

The decision concludes with a Comment that first points out that the constitutional obligation to pay per capita can only be changed by the General Assembly and that for the realities of the current circumstances “The time has come for the General Assembly to provide more guidance on this point.” They then take this a step further and conclude the narrative with this observation:

The loss of per capita funds from financially strapped congregations is another issue altogether, and is addressed, in our opinion inadequately, by the vague standards relating to whether funds are available within presbyteries. Further, we would be remiss in not noting that reality of declining funding is a symptom, not the disease. The underlying causes must be prayerfully addressed at local, presbytery, synod and General Assembly levels, not in the denominational courts or in unconstitutional actions.

The second decision comes in a remedial case filed against San Francisco Presbytery related to its process in dismissing Community Presbyterian Church of Danville, California. In September of 2009 the Presbytery adopted a Gracious Dismissal Policy (version from Summer 2010 with corrections). In November 2010, after a ten month process that included a special informational presbytery meeting, the Presbytery dismissed the church with an agreement for payments to help offset the loss of per capita and mission funding, but no payments required for the congregation to keep the property. Three presbyters filed the remedial complaint charging that the Presbytery had not properly handled the case considering that property was involved. In their unanimous decision – Rev. Wilbert Tom, HR, Rev. David Hawbecker, HR, and Thomas Conrad, Complainants, v. The Presbytery of San Francisco, Respondent – the SPJC of the Synod of the Pacific did not sustain any of the charges, but for a variety of reasons.

As we delve into this we first need to pull that previous version of the Book of Order off the shelf since that was the constitution in effect at the time of the contested process and all citations are to that version.  Two sections were front and center in this case and I am sure that you know what they are.

G-8.0201  Al l property held by or for a particular church, a presbytery, a synod, the General Assembly, or the Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.), whether legal title is lodged in a corporation, a trustee or
trustees, or an unincorporated association, and whether the
property is used in programs of a particular church or of a more
inclusive governing body or retained for the production of income,
is held in trust nevertheless for the use and benefit of the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.).

and one of the responsibilities and powers of a presbytery

G-11.0103i . to divide, dismiss, or dissolve churches in consultation with their members;

I want to add two more notes at this point which were not in the forefront of this case but which were kept in mind. The first is the continuation of the section on property:

G-8.0301 Whenever property of, or held for, a particular church of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) ceases to be used by that church as a particular church of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) in accordance with this Constitution, such property shall be held, used, applied, transferred, or sold as provided by the presbytery.

The second is a paragraph from the 1993 Nature of the Church Report to General Assembly (pg. 16)

The American tradition was being formed. In the Scottish church, all ultimate authority rested in and came from the assembly. But in the American church, the presbytery was the originating authority, relating particular churches into a larger whole. The 1788 Form of Government declared that “. ..no act of a General Assembly could become a standing rule without first being referred to the presbyteries, and securing the consent of at least a majority of them.” The presbytery is the very heart of the Presbyterian system.

The core thesis of the charges in the remedial case were that at worst the presbytery did not have the authority to dismiss a church with property because property “is held in trust nevertheless for the use and benefit of the
Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)” [i.e. the whole church must be involved]. At best, the case charged that the presbytery did not fulfill its duties as the trustee for the wider church by letting the property go without payment.

In the amended charges there were 13 specifications of error two of which were withdrawn by the Complainants during trial. I won’t go through all of them since most were not sustained either because no relief could be granted or Complainants failed to meet the burden of proof. Three charges form the core of the complaint and the rational of the decision:

Specification of Error No. 1. Complainants contend that the Presbytery’s vote of November 9, 2010, to approve dismissal of the CPCD under terms which included Presbytery’s relinquishment of any and all interests of the PCUSA in the Property without compensation in favor of the EPC is an action which is based on an error in Constitutional interpretation, in that the Presbytery does not own the Property but holds the Property in trust for the use and benefit of the PCUSA (G-8.0201).

Specification of Error No. 2. The Presbytery failed to meet its Constitutional responsibility as trustee in accordance with the Form of Government Part G, Chapter VIII of the Book of Order. As trustee, the Presbytery is obligated to act on behalf of the greater church, to ensure that all property held or used by its particular churches and their respective congregations is held, used and applied in a manner that faithfully advances and serves the ministry and witness of the PCUSA.

Specification of Error No. 4. The Presbytery acted against the Constitution of the PCUSA in that it failed to hold, use, apply, transfer or sell the Property for the benefit of the PCUSA. G-8.0301 provides:
[quoted above]

…Taken together, the provisions of Part G Chapter VIII require the Presbytery to act as a faithful trustee on behalf of the PCUSA in exercising its responsibility and power under the above-referenced Chapter and at Part G Chapter XI, to “divide, dismiss, or dissolve churches in consultation with their members” (G-11.0103i). By its vote on November 9, 2010, the Presbytery failed to act as a faithful trustee under the Constitution.

The rational from the SPJC is remarkably brief in not sustaining these charges. They note that all parties agree the Trust Clause means the property is held for the benefit of the wider church. They then reiterate “Under G-11.0103i, Presbytery has the authority to dismiss a church in consultation with its members to another reformed body” and note that the Presbytery had a process in place and that process was faithfully followed. Having followed the process and in consistency with its policy, they note that the Presbytery exercised its discretion granted under G-8.0301. They then conclude:

In good faith, Presbytery determined that acceptance of the PET [Presbytery Engagement Team] recommendations for dismissal would best serve the overall witness and ministry of the Church of Jesus Christ, thus benefitting [sic] the PC(USA).

Other charges not sustained because no admissible evidence was supplied or the burden of proof was not met include a couple financial ones – the small ratio of payments to Presbytery versus the value of the property and the cost of starting new ministries in the Presbytery. There were charges concerning the flawed nature of the Gracious Dismissal Policy and consideration of state law in the process which were not sustained because no relief could be granted. And two charges, one withdrawn and one not meeting the burden of proof/could not grant relief, questioned the qualifications of the Evangelical Presbyterian Church as a Reformed body a church could be dismissed to.

In summary, the Presbytery did have the authority and did act faithfully and in good faith in dismissing the congregation with their property.

And now, the rest of the story…

This decision also contains a comment which notes the limited applicability of this decision not just because it was decided at the Synod level but because the Gracious Dismissal Policy has been suspended. In light of this first application of the policy the Presbytery decided to suspend the policy and review it and you can read the review team’s September 2011 report. Regarding revisions specific to property and the Trust Clause, here is the relevant portion of the report’s rational (edited slightly for length):

Moreover, San Francisco Presbytery’s original dismissal policy has been challenged in our church courts because of Presbytery’s responsibility for enforcing the property trust clause. It is simply not an option for a presbytery to opt out of a required constitutional responsibility for its enforcement.

We believe that the revised dismissal policy needs to address not only the requirements of the property trust clause, but also the importance of every church in fulfilling Presbytery’s mission (as it becomes clearly defined) within our geographic area. When a congregation seeks to withdraw, Presbytery should consider whether it needs to establish a replacement church in that community and the cost of such action. If a congregation walks away from our denomination without consideration for the injury suffered by the whole, by that departure, it will remind us of every congregation’s sinful tendency to be separate and self-sufficient. We all belong to one another and together constitute the risen Body of Christ.

We have therefore proposed that, ordinarily, a departing church will pay to Presbytery a minimum 10% of the value of the church property. This guidance is based, in part, on the Biblical concept of tithing. However, our policy provides flexibility for the teams negotiating on behalf of Presbytery and the congregation to adjust the recommended amount of compensation depending upon the particular circumstances of the congregation in question… In addition to the property issues, Presbytery will also have to discern in each situation its past, present and future mission with respect to the number of members withdrawing and those wishing to remain with PCUSA, the presence of other Presbyterian congregations in that vicinity, and ongoing mission and outreach efforts in the area.

This revised policy, and proposed amendments to it, are still under discussion by the Presbytery and will probably be influenced by this SPJC decision.

So we have one decision that affirms presbytery obligations under our connectionalism, admittedly as interpreted as by the GA and its PJC. And we have another decision that affirms the presbytery as the basic unit to deal with congregational and presbytery property under the Trust Clause.

What next? Good question. Both decisions strike me as sound and consistent with current constitutional interpretations so I would be skeptical of the success of an appeal to the GAPJC. That does not mean that there won’t be one. For the San Francisco case in particular, with the revision of the policy underway and the limited number of specifications of error that were considered to be in order and could be dealt with, I could see an appeal not being accepted because the case would be considered moot. We will see if any of the parties in these cases consider it beneficial to appeal.

Stay tuned…

Presbyterian News Headlines For The Week Ending March 24, 2012

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[Editor’s note: I have decided to start a weekly rundown of news stories related to, or that have implications for, the various Presbyterian branches. My blogging time has been restricted lately and while I would love to comment at length on a few of these I probably will not get to them in a timely manner.  I do however reserve the right to do so if I get around to it.]

Maryland bill would help congregations in fight over control of church assets

from The Washington Post on March 18, 2012
This proposal in Maryland to repeal a 1976 state law regarding implied trust on property specifically relates to two Methodist Congregations that desire to separate from their denomination.  However, the broader implications for all hierarchical denominations are interesting.

Self acclaimed prophets cautioned against predicting winner in elections

from Ghana Broadcasting Corporation
Here is the core of the article

The Evangelical Presbyterian Church Synod Moderator for the West Volta
Presbytery, Reverend Joce Kofi Kodade, has called on Ghanaians to ignore
public pronouncements by self acclaimed prophets who predict winners
ahead of the conduct of this year’s general elections.

He said such proclamations may cause tension, adding that it is rather
necessary for religious leaders as unifiers to uphold and demonstrate
ethical virtues of neutrality and integrity during political campaigns.

National Council of Churches releases their 2012 Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches

from National Council of Churches on March 20, 2012
In which we learn that overall giving to churches dropped $1.2 billion last year, that six of the 25 largest denominations that reported data saw an increase in membership (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, National Baptist Convention, Seventh-Day Adventists, Assemblies of God, Pentecostal Assemblies of the World and the Jehovah’s Witnesses), and the largest decline in membership was in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (down 5.90%). The PC(USA) reported a decline of 3.42%.

Minister calls for Presbyterians to include gays

from gaynz.com on March 21, 2012
In a funeral sermon preached for his gay colleague The Rev. David Clark, the Rev. Dr. Allan
Davidson ONZM called on the Presbyterian Church of Aotearoa New Zealand to rescind their 2004 General Assembly action prohibiting active homosexuals from holding ordained office.

Stated Clerk Nomination Committee selects Parsons for a second term

from PC(USA) on March 21, 2012
The Stated Clerk Nominating Committee of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) has endorsed the Rev. Gradye Parsons for a second term as Stated Clerk of the General Assembly. There were no other nominations submitted to the committee.

PC(USA) Synod of the Trinity Permenant Judicial Commission rules that the new Form of Government still requires payment of per capita

SPJC Decison on March 23, 2012
The Synod PJC found that the language in the new Form of Government is not less restrictive regarding the payment of per capita and the change in language is not significant enough to render a previous Authoritative Interpretation as no longer in force.
[Ed. note: I will revisit this in more detail, hopefully later this week.]

PC(USA) GAPJC Decision In The Spahr 2012 Case: 1. The Decision

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As you may have heard the Permanent Judicial Commission of the General Assembly (GAPJC) of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) published four decisions yesterday. Wait, let me rephrase that – You may have heard about a GAPJC decision that hit the news yesterday. (For the polity wonks I actually think one of the other decisions is more interesting so I will try to comment on that in the next couple of days.)

The case is Disciplinary Case 220-08: Jane Adams Spahr, Appellant (Accused), v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) through the Presbytery of the Redwoods, Appellee (Complainant). Of the 15 GAPJC commissioners who heard the case, six of them signed one or both dissenting opinions.

This disciplinary case results from an accusation that was filed after the Rev. Spahr conducted same-sex marriages during the window when these marriages were permissible under civil law in the state of California. Among other things, this case became a test of whether a PC(USA) minister (teaching elder) could preform a ceremony presented as a marriage when permitted by the state.

At the present time the precedent for the interpretation of the PC(USA) constitution on this matter is the previous decision regarding Rev. Spahr (the Spahr 2008 decision 218-12) which now-famously stated (pg. 4):

The ceremonies that are the subject of this case were not marriages as the term is defined by W-4.9001. These were ceremonies between women, not between a man and a woman. Both parties acknowledged the ceremonies in question were not marriages as defined by the Book of Order. It is not improper for ministers of the Word and Sacrament to perform same sex ceremonies. At least four times, the larger church has rejected overtures that would prohibit blessing the unions of same sex couples. By the definition in W-4.9001, a same sex ceremony can never be a marriage. The SPJC found Spahr guilty of doing that which by definition cannot be done. One cannot characterize same sex ceremonies as marriages for the purpose of disciplining a minister of the Word and Sacrament and at the same time declare that such ceremonies are not marriages for legal or ecclesiastical purposes.

As that paragraph implies, the GAPJC overturned her earlier conviction on appeal because under the PC(USA) Constitution’s definition there is no such thing as a same-sex marriage.

Having now been charged and found guilty by the Presbytery PJC of new similar offenses in this regard the court had to decide on appeal whether her conviction on grounds of representing a same-sex ceremony as a marriage was correct.

In the decision nine specifications of error were regrouped into three different specifications of error, none of which was sustained. The first dealt with all the constitutional issues, the second that the various PJC’s have erred by “usurping the legislative power of the General Assembly,” and the third that there was a procedural error with the Synod PJC rephrasing the charges.

Regarding the constitutional issues the GAPJC decision says:

In Spahr 2008, Spahr was directed to refrain from implying, stating, or representing that a same-sex ceremony is a marriage. Within months of that order, Spahr performed marriage ceremonies for approximately sixteen same-sex couples. Although counsel for both parties confirmed that state law recognizes the legality of these marriages, the change in state law did not and could not change what is permissible for marriages to be authorized by the PC(USA).

and

The issue is not simply the same-sex ceremony. It is the misrepresentation that the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) recognizes the ceremony and the resulting relationship to be a marriage in the eyes of the church. By the definition of W-4.9001, such a result cannot be. So the critical question is not whether the definitional language creates proscribed conduct, it is whether it is permissible to represent that one is doing something which one cannot constitutionally do.

and

This Commission agrees with the SPJC regarding Specification of Error No. 1 d and e (Appellant’s Specifications of Error Nos. 6, 7, and 8). The SPJC correctly found that “being faithful to Scripture and the Constitution on other matters does not provide a defense for the actions charged in this case,” and “the constitutional interpretations of Spahr (2008) and Southard by the PPJC are not inconsistent with the Book of Order when read as a whole.” Both the PPJC and SPJC found that Spahr’s conduct violated the Constitution.

The Decision portion where all this is laid out is relatively short, encompassing just over one page. Pretty short for nine specifications of error.

One commissioner, Barbara Bundick, wrote a concurring opinion which brings out a couple of interesting points. The first is that in some jurisdictions even if same-sex marriage is recognized by the state if it is not recognized by the clergy’s denomination that can invalidate the marriage. That is not an issue in this case since California does not have that provision but the point is made that those preforming marriages must be cautious about this in some jurisdictions.

Secondly, this concurrence takes issue with the GAPJC decision for not addressing liturgical forms.  It says:

While I affirm the majority opinion, I have serious concerns that the majority, in affirming the SPJC’s decision, is also affirming the SPJC’s criticism of the content of the ceremonies and the counseling Spahr conducted. In drawing a distinction between same-sex blessings, which are permissible, and same-sex marriages, which are not, the authoritative interpretations have gone beyond the definition of marriage to dictate the nature of the liturgy that can be used in same-sex blessings. […] In Spahr 2008, this Commission stated “the liturgy should be kept distinct for the two types of services.” This aspect of the precedent has created a difficult situation for those who minister to the GLBT community.

There is an inevitable and legitimate overlap between a same-sex blessing ceremony and a mixed-sex marriage ceremony. Both ceremonies involve a couple making promises to each other in the presence of God, their families and their community. As oft noted, “Form follows function.” Moreover, many, if not most of the trappings surrounding such ceremonies reflect popular culture rather than Biblical command. Given the overlap and the input from popular culture, how the two liturgies can be “kept distinct” is a mystery.

Requiring different liturgies has led to judicial micromanagement of the liturgy.

and concludes

The best solution is for the General Assembly to amend the definition of marriage to authorize teaching elders and commissioned ruling elders to preside at the marriages of same-sex couples in civil jurisdictions that recognize such marriages as legal. The definition now found in W-4.9001 was never designed for these circumstances. It was adopted in a world where same-sex marriages were inconceivable. By retaining that definition despite the increasing number of jurisdictions recognizing same-sex marriage, the church creates a form of second class citizenship for faithful Christians despite all the other places in the Book of Order where the full equality of persons regardless of sexual orientation is affirmed. I encourage the General Assembly to so act.

The second concurrence was signed by three commissioners and begins by looking at the Appellant’s arguments and suggesting “The Appellant asks this Commission to substitute her own interpretation for that made by this Commission in Spahr 2008.” It continues to discuss the fact that pastoral care and marriage are two different things in the Book of Order and they are to be considered separately. They say “Descriptions of pastoral care found in the Directory of Worship do not reach to the question of marriage.” It concludes by pointing out:

The appropriate way to redefine marriage and permissible practice within the PC(USA) is not through individual reinterpretation of the advice of the larger church, but by means of an amendment to the Constitution approved by the
General Assembly and ratified by the presbyteries of the church.

The first of the two dissents, signed by six commissioners, begins by saying that the majority decision is at odds with the PC(USA) constitution talking about the “equality and rights of all people.” It then talks about how we got here:

Both parties agree that before the 2008 Spahr decision there was no limitation on the conduct of teaching elders (clergy) regarding how they approached the matter of gay marriage, although most of the denomination hesitated to perform same gender marriages.

It goes on to say:

The larger church has repeatedly declined to amend W-4.9001 with regard to same-sex ceremonies. The church needs a sharper degree of clarification and guidance that precisely defines how it understands marriage, especially in light of the high financial and personal burden involved. Given the contention regarding the nature and practice of Christian marriage in our time, it would be important and valuable for the Church, through its General Assembly, to state its definition in clearer and more precise legislation.

and concludes with

Since the Directory for Worship is part of our constitution and the majority has found that it may give rise to disciplinary cases, then it should be immediately amended to clearly state that we fully welcome the LGBT community into their rightful place in our church, including allowing them to marry.

Overall, this is the one section that argues most strongly that the strict definition of marriage in W-4.9001 is wrong on equality and justice grounds. Some may see this as the natural linkage of the church’s stand for equality and justice while others will see it as advocacy beyond the the prevue of a PJC decision and possibly even judicial activism.

In reading this I do have trouble with their argument in the second section I quoted.  I think many in the church would argue that when the larger church has “repeatedly declined to amend W-4.9001 with regard to same-sex ceremonies” that does indeed provide a sharp “degree of clarification and guidance.” As for the GA stating its definition in clearer and more precise language, I refer you to the report to the 219th GA of the Special Committee to Study Issues of Civil Unions and Christian Marriage where it says (p. 13):

What is the place of covenanted same-gender partnerships in the Christian community? The members of the PC(USA) cannot agree.

However, having said that, I will agree that while we will have trouble agreeing on a definition of marriage in an ecclesiastical sense, the PC(USA) Constitutional definition would be enhanced by a recognition that in a civil sense that reality is no longer always “one man and one woman.”

Five of those six commissioners on the first dissent continue on in the second dissent concerning the interpretation of the Directory for Worship. They begin:

The majority judges this case primarily in relation to the decisions in Spahr (2008) and Southard (2011) in a conviction that, behind its judicial interpretation, there is in the Constitution an explicit basis against officiating in a same-sex marriage. In fact, this conviction rests upon an assumption rather than explicit constitutional rule. It is grounded principally upon one section, even one sentence, in the Directory of Worship, that is claimed to have clear and obvious legal status. The Commission assumes here and in earlier cases that W-4.9001 presents a legal basis for denying the permissibility and validity of same-sex marriage because it presents a “definition” of marriage as exclusively between a man and a woman. This assumption is flawed. This provision in the Directory of Worship cannot serve effectively as a judicial criterion.

They then argue that W-4.9001 reflects a different point in time when “The exclusive conventional norm was heterosexual marriage, when same-sex marriage, either civil or ecclesiastical, was unimaginable.”  They go on to argue that this section is introductory and narrative and that “To claim that this paragraph is primarily and intentionally legal in nature forces an artificial warp upon its evident narrative purpose.” Finally, they point out that grammatically the primary emphasis of the one sentence is the covenant nature of marriage and not the “one man and one woman.” The dissent concludes:

In this case and the other recent decisions, my principal concern is that this Commission has forged a standard upon an extremely fragile provision, employing a strained interpretation that does not provide the necessary legal foundation for resolution of our dilemma or foster pastoral guidance in the life of the church. By relying so heavily on W-4.9001, the Commission has ruled upon convention rather than law.

I enjoyed reading this dissent and even if you don’t agree with their conclusion if you want to read a well presented argument against the prescriptive nature of this section of the Directory for Worship have a look at it.

So, at this point the Rev. Spahr has reached her final appeal and will be subject to Rebuke by the Presbytery of the Redwoods. However, according to the L.A. Times article she has said that she will continue preforming same-sex marriages. (Although, at the moment they are not permitted in California.)

But getting back to polity questions, what does all this mean? Considering the number of statements that have been made and the wide variety of overtures that are headed to the 220th General Assembly this decision could have significant implications. And that my fellow polity wonks I will take up in Part 2.

Synod PJC Upholds the Presbytery PJC Decision In Spahr Case

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The Rev. Jane Adams Spahr appealed the decision of the Presbytery of the Redwoods Permanent Judicial Commission in her disciplinary case to the Permanent Judicial Commission of the Synod of the Pacific. The appeal was heard Friday March 25 and the decision released early last week.  The executive summary is that the Synod PJC, without dissent, did not sustain any of the 13 specifications of error and attached an interesting comment section which identifies two important points of polity for the General Assembly PJC to consider on further appeal.  The Presbytery PJC decision remains in force.

Briefly, the background in this case is that the Rev. Spahr was previously tried for preforming same-sex ceremonies that could be interpreted as a Christian marriage but the GAPJC found that, by the definition in the Book of Order, a same-sex union can not be a marriage and therefore she was not guilty because what she was charged with was not possible (Spahr(2008) decision).  The Rev. Spahr has since conducted more ceremonies and has been charged again with this offense.  The Presbytery PJC found her guilty, following the GAPJC precedent and interpretation, and gave her both a rebuke and an apology for having to find her guilty under current church law.

There is an important and pressing polity issue embedded in this case which is the situation of preforming same-sex marriages in a civil jurisdiction that permits them, in this case California during the “window period,” but when the church does not permit or recognize them.  In the recent Southard decision, which involved a marriage ceremony in Massachusetts, this issue was not addressed since the GAPJC dismissed the charges on appeal based on the fact that the Rev. Southard performed the ceremony before the Spahr (2008) decision was published.  [Correction: this issue was addressed – see the comment below]

In this present case the facts are not in doubt — all those concerned are clear that the ceremonies preformed were intended to be rituals of Christian marriage officiated by an officer of the church and were consistant with the laws of the State of California at the time of the ceremonies.  But as the SPJC notes at the beginning of the Preliminary Statement “…the outcome of this case depends upon the application of ecclesiastical precedent to those facts.”

The SPJC notes that the controlling precedent is the Southard decision and goes on to say:

The question is this: in the performance of these same-gender marriages, did Spahr’s participation in any way “state, imply or represent” that these ceremonies were ecclesiastical marriages, the standard set in Southard? This Commission concludes that it did.

After a summary review of the facts and testimony in the case the SPJC concludes with

The standard at the time Spahr conducted the weddings and the standard used by the PPJC in arriving at its decision was Spahr (2008), which held “that officers of the PC(USA) authorized to perform marriages shall not state, imply or represent that a same sex ceremony is a marriage.” Southard followed and offered a more narrow view. This Commission is compelled to follow Southard as the most recent decision by the GAPJC. There is no prejudice to the parties because the conduct prohibited by Southard is a subset of the conduct previously prohibited by Spahr (2008).

Because of the number of specifications of error, and the fact that none were sustained, I will not walk through all 13.  The key specification was number 2 — “The Presbytery Permanent Judicial Commission erred in constitutional interpretation when it determined the Rev. Jane Adams Spahr committed ‘the offense of representing that a same sex ceremony was a marriage.'”  The response to this specification is the longest, references back to the Preliminary Statement and wraps up with “Under both Spahr (2008) and Southard, the implication that a civil marriage is also an ecclesiastical marriage when performed for same-sex couples is a violation of the constitutional standard.”  The decisions in three other specifications refer back to this rational.

In three of the specifications of error (9, 10, and 11) the specification points to sections of the Book of Order related to inclusion and justice and makes the claim that the PPJC decision “…constitutes both error in constitutional interpretation and injustice in the decision.”  In all three cases the SPJC responded “The constitutional interpretations of Spahr (2008) and Southard by the PPJC are not inconsistent with the Book of Order when read as a whole.”

And for the polity wonks, the SPJC did their job fact checking the specifications of error because they note that one reference cited in a specification (G-5.0502) “has no application to this case” and that another (G-5.0202) does not exist.

The SPJC has included at the end of the decision a one-page Comments section where they make note of three important polity points in this case.

Let me jump to point 2 first, because this is the church-state matter I have raise before. The SPJC raises the concern for the pastoral role of Teaching Elders and here is their comment, in its entirety with my emphasis added in the last paragraph:

2. This Commission has a continuing concern about the pastoral role of a Minister of Word and Sacrament to those same-gender partners who wish to have a civil marriage. Spahr and Southard help to clarify the difference between civil and ecclesiastical weddings and the prohibitions required from PCUSA clergy in officiating at same-gender ecclesiastical weddings.

Our concern is for those PCUSA clergy who wish to officiate at a same-gender civil wedding. What would such a minister need to do to faithfully perform a civil wedding while conforming to PCUSA polity regarding ecclesiastical weddings? Would a Minister of Word and Sacrament be faithful to PCUSA polity, for example, if they officiated in a civil wedding outside a church plant, performed without any reference to the Directory for Worship, have the wedding license signed with no reference to a denomination or an ordination, or sans any other implication stated or unstated to the PCUSA? Or, is it a violation of church polity for PCUSA clergy to officiate at a civil same-gender wedding in all circumstances?

In a time when increasing numbers of states permit same-gender weddings and civil unions, it is important for the church to clarify how its clergy might pastorally participate in such secular occasions while honoring the PCUSA’s definition of Christian marriage.

I mention this first because I think their first points relates to this.  The first comment is about the role of the GAPJC in interpreting the constitution: “It is troubling that the GAPJC appears to have usurped the legislative province of the General Assembly when it created a new basis for discipline in Spahr (2008)… Whatever our opinion of the principle may be, it would appear that if the GAPJC has authority to proscribe specific behavior in this instance, it may do so in many other instances as well.”

An important and interesting observation, but one I do not entirely agree with.  I agree that any issue is best dealt with through the full General Assembly, but we also must realize the the Assembly has limitations in time.  At one time in the mainline church, and currently in some Presbyterian branches, the full GA sits as a judicial body deciding such cases. However, with typically a dozen cases now coming to the GAPJC between Assemblies there is no time in the full Assembly’s schedule for individually hearing these cases themselves.  For purposes of expediency and efficiency the GAPJC has been empowered as a commission to act with the Assembly’s authority in these matters.

Regarding legislative action on these matters the Assembly has had the opportunity to speak and has chosen not to.  Even regarding the formation of the Special Committee on Civil Union and Christian Marriage, on which I served, the Assembly charged us with writing a social witness document and explicitly charged us not to write a polity statement. Given this vacuum the GAPJC was in the position to fill it when a question arose.  While I fully agree that “The General Assembly and the presbyteries are more representative and better equipped to consider such matters by the usual practice of amending the Book of Order,” to date they have not, or are content to let the GAPJC decisions be the guiding authority.

Finally, the third comment is a message to us all and is important enough to quote it in full:

3. The Presbyterian Church (USA) has had a long season of discourse and debate regarding issues involving the participation of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender persons within the life of the church. Bound by the call of Scripture and Christ’s message of grace and love, many have chosen to stay in the midst of conflict to serve as advocates for those people and issues important to them. This Commission heard argument referencing the personal and poignant nature of this debate from participants on all sides who care at deep levels about the direction the church may go. The goodwill evidenced between the parties and their commitment to the church’s discernment process was an example of how members may remain faithful to their convictions yet further the resolution of conflict. In her decision to stay within the bounds of the PC(USA) and be subject to the church’s polity and discipline, Rev. Spahr’s ministry provides another example of engagement and commitment. May the church, as it continues this debate, find friends among colleagues in ministry and work with them, remaining subject to the ordering of God’s Word and Spirit.

So for the moment nothing has
changed in this debate.  The indication is that there will be an appeal to the GAPJC so we will have to wait for that to play out before we have an interpretation and guidance on the nature of marriage as described in Confessions and the Book of Order. Stay tuned…

New PC(USA) GAPJC Decision — The Southard Decision

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Yesterday the General Assembly Permanent Judicial Commission of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) released their decision in disciplinary case 220-102:

Southard v. PC(USA) through Presbytery of Boston


If you are looking for a sound-bite length summary of the whole case you will not find one.  The Commission has given us a multi-layered decision, but has done us the favor of helping to define the layers.

The facts of the case are agreed by both sides: That on March 1, 2008, the Rev. Jean Southard officiated at a marriage ceremony between two women in Waltham, Massachusetts.  The ceremony was characterized by the participants as a “Christian Marriage.”  Further details are enumerated in the history section of the opinion to show that this same-sex ceremony was represented as a marriage ceremony.

Two additional legal details are important to keep in mind here:

  1. At the time of this ceremony same-sex civil marriage was legal in the state of Massachusetts.
  2. The decision in disciplinary case 218-12, Spahr v. PC(USA) through Presbytery of Redwoods, was decided on April 28, 2008, about two months after this ceremony was preformed.

In the Presbytery Permanent Judicial Commission trial the Commission acquitted the Rev. Southard saying in part:

The Prosecuting Committee has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that W-4.9000 contains mandatory language that would prohibit a Minister of Word and Sacrament from performing a same-gender marriage.
Since the Preface to the Directory of Worship (clause b) states that the Directory uses language that is “simply descriptive”, this Commission takes this to mean that the definition of Christian marriage in W-4.9001 is merely descriptive; there is no mandatory language in this article.

This was overturned on appeal by the Presbytery to the PJC of the Synod of the Northeast.  The Rev. Southard appealed that decision to the GAPJC.

First layer: The specific actions of Rev. Southard
The GAPJC wrote this regarding the charges related to the ceremony preformed by Rev. Southard:

This Commission concluded in Spahr that prior authoritative interpretations lacked mandatory language. Southard conducted this ceremony two months prior to Spahr. Sensitive to the authoritative interpretation in Spahr, this Commission agrees with the SPJC that Spahr cannot be applied retroactively to the facts of this case. Therefore, Southard did not violate the Book of Order or her ordination vows by erring in her constitutional interpretation. She did not commit an offense because the applicable authoritative interpretation (Spahr) had not yet been promulgated.

So, a definite line has been drawn in PC(USA) polity at April 28, 2008, when the GAPJC decision in the Spahr case provided an authoritative interpretation that the language in the Directory for Worship is mandatory.

Based on this conclusion the charges against the Rev. Southard are not valid and she is acquitted of violating the constitutional requirements of the PC(USA).  The first two specifications of error in the appeal, the ones dealing with the specific charges, are sustained.

Second layer: Constitutional Interpretation
Here is the “but” that the GAPJC seems to be putting in the decision.  The third specification of error deals not with the specifics of the ceremony preformed by with more general constitutional interpretation:

The SPJC erred in constitutional interpretation by determining that a minister of the Word and Sacrament who performs (participating in and directing) a same-gender marriage as a Christian marriage commits an offense prohibited by the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Authoritative Interpretations and violates his or her ordination vows.

This specification of error was not sustained.  The decision essentially says that the status quo, the current prohibition made mandatory in the Spahr decision, is in effect.  The new polity twist in this case was the fact that same-sex marriage is legal in some states, but the GAPJC says that when it comes to Christian Marriage in the PC(USA) that does not matter:

The question before this Commission, then, is whether the Massachusetts law defining this relationship as a legal marriage changes the impact of the definitions in W-4.9001. This Commission holds that it does not. While the PCUSA is free to amend its definition of marriage, a change in state law does not amend the Book of Order. It is the responsibility of the church, following the processes provided in the Constitution for amendment, to define what the PCUSA recognizes as a “Christian marriage.” Consequently, Spahr’s holding, “By the definition in W-4.9001, a same sex ceremony can never be a marriage,” remains in effect.

This Commission further held in Spahr, for prospective application, “that the liturgy should be kept distinct for the two types of services.” In light of the change in the laws of some states, this Commission reiterates that officers of the PCUSA who are authorized to perform marriages, when performing a ceremony for a same-gender couple, shall not state, imply, or represent that the same-gender ceremony is an ecclesiastical marriage ceremony as defined by PCUSA polity, whether or not the civil jurisdiction allows same-gender civil marriages.

So, it was not an offense back in March of 2008, and it might not be prohibited at some future point, but the Commission reasserts that it is prohibited now in the church, even if civil same-sex marriage is permitted by the state.  This also seems to imply that while the officiating pastor may not be guilty of an offense, if the Spahr decision is extended to this one, no marriage ceremony was actually preformed since “a same sex ceremony can never be a marriage.”

Technical details
There are four more specifications of error which were decided on procedural grounds.  In the case of specifications 4 and 5 they were not sustained because they “do not accurately reflect the holding of the SPJC as to the matters involved.”  In the case of specifications 6 and 7, the errors were sustained.  These dealt with the decision of the SPJC which reversed the PPJC’s decision when it should have remanded the case back to the PPJC for a new trial and in doing so did not provide specificity on one of the charges.  With the dismissal of the charges these are rendered moot.

Concurring Opinions
There are three concurring opinions attached to this decision.

1) This opinion, signed by five commissioners, expresses the sentiment that this is at its core a human rights issue and in light of that urges the PC(USA) to “amend the constitution to allow for the marriage of same sex couples in the PCUSA, and otherwise welcome gay, lesbian, and bisexual people into the full fellowship of the church.”

2) This is the longest concurring opinion, running a full page in narrative, signed by six commissioners.  Four of these six also signed the first concurring opinion. As the authors say, “[Our] concern is whether W-4.9001 provides an effective and unambiguous definition of Christian marriage.”  To the point they write later on:

To claim that this paragraph is primarily and intentionally legal in nature places a strain upon its obvious narrative purpose. As a fourfold theological outline of Christian marriage in narrative form, it is arguable that it propose
s either regulatory imperative or legal intention. Certainly, it does not have the kind of language or format that the church has come to expect in definitional statements, for the language in this paragraph is not obviously legislative, in the sense of providing regulatory lines that define boundaries or proscribe behavior.

and

Thus, W-4.9001 has become contested regarding whether it can bear the interpretive weight that judicial process and decision has put upon it. The church needs a sharper degree of clarification and guidance that precisely defines how it understands marriage, especially in light of the high financial and personal burden involved.

For all the polity wonks out there, I recommend having a look at this concurring opinion — you may or may not agree with it, but they have done a good job of clearly stating where there might be problems when theological narrative is applied as polity for judicial process.  (And now I am going to have a look at nFOG and see how it would stand up to this test.)

3) I will let the opening paragraph of the third concurring opinion, signed by three commissioners, speak for itself:

We concur with the Decision of the Commission, and with the holding that Spahr is not applicable as precedent because the actions taken by Southard took place before the Spahr Decision was rendered. However, it is disingenuous of Southard to claim that no guidance was available from the larger church on the advisability of performing a same-gender marriage.

Their point is that the Spahr Decision is not the first one and enough guidance is present in the 1991 Authoritative Interpretation and the 2000 Benton Decision to have discouraged this ceremony from happening.  The opinion concludes “While Southard may be commended for her desire to provide compassionate pastoral care, a failure to seek out the guidance of the larger Church would raise a concern about Southard’s willingness to ‘be governed by our church’s polity, and to abide its discipline.'”

Personal Comments
Having served on the PC(USA) Special Committee on Civil Union and Christian Marriage I want to add just a brief comment about the polity situation the PC(USA) now finds itself in.

As the second concurring opinion points out so clearly, section W-4.9001 of the Book of Order provides a theological definition of marriage where even the civil dimension is part of God’s order.  Our committee was painfully aware that there are on-going changes in the civil realm that those of us of faith can speak to, but the church as an institution can not control.  This means that the second point of the four-fold definition of marriage is something we as a church can not specify and yet we have it in our constitution.  While some of us would have liked to have seen something done, with the theological diversity on the committee the exact nature of the adjustment was not immediately clear.  The discussion was however moot since our charge from the General Assembly was to make our report a social witness document and the charge excluded from our purview constitutional changes.  As you are probably aware, the 219th General Assembly accepted our report for study and took no further action on constitutional changes.

Looking Forward
If you are following these issues in the PC(USA) then you are no doubt aware that another, similar case is working its way through the judicial process.  Back in August there was a new trial for the Rev. Jane Adams Spahr where she was charged with, and found guilty of, conducting same-sex marriages.  The circumstances are similar because such marriages were permitted under California law at the time they were preformed.  She has filed an appeal to the Synod PJC and there is every expectation that whatever the decision is there an appeal to the GA PJC will be heard at some point in the next year or so.

As you might expect this case comes with an additional twist of its own.  The presbytery sustained the charge that Rev. Spahr had “persisted in a pattern or practice of
disobedience concerning the aforementioned authoritative interpretation
of the Book of Order.”

At first glance, it appears that the GAPJC has now clearly set the legal tests for hearing this case.  The PPJC seems to have thought so in finding her guilty but expressing their personal disagreement with the outcome.  But as we know, there is still the appeal to be heard by the Synod PJC and there may be other procedural issues that arise.  We will see how the process plays out.

Well, I think you see why I described this decision as defying simple sound bites.  On the one hand, this case is over and the defendant has been found not guilty.  On the other hand, the PC(USA) constitutional standard – as currently understood by judicial commission interpretation – has been reiterated, including the understanding that earlier same-sex marriage ceremonies could not, by definition, actually be marriage ceremonies in the PC(USA).  Stay tuned to see where this legal standard takes us in the future…

Synod PJC Ruling In The Case Of Caledonia And Others v. Knox

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This past weekend the Permanent Judicial Commission of the Synod of Lakes and Prairies heard and decided the complaint of The Session, Caledonia Presbyterian Church, Paula Bremer, James Gunn, Alan Crandall, Jerry Indermark, James F Scaife, The Presbytery of Central Florida, The Presbytery of Prospect Hill, and Stockton Presbytery v. John Knox Presbytery.  (And thanks to the Covenant Network for posting a PDF of the decision)

The case involves the examination for ordination and declaration of an exception by Mr. Scott Anderson approved by John Knox Presbytery last Spring. Not a lot of intro needed here because the background, context, and implications are nearly identical to the Parnell decision I commented on a week ago.  Check that post out for the relevant polity comments. In this case there were three specifications of error regarding the process and the application of ordination standards.  By a 7-2 vote the PJC found that the Presbytery had followed the correct procedure:

The John Knox Presbytery acted within its authority following G-13.0103(r) using the most recent Authoritative Interpretation (Al) (2008)…
…
The SPJC finds that John Knox Presbytery properly took responsibility for that decision. Therefore, permitting Anderson to declare a departure or exception from Section G-6.0106(b) was within the authority of the Presbytery.

There was a dissenting opinion which said, in part:

The majority finds that as the Presbytery followed the provisions of G-6.0108 and the PUP and Knox AIs, it could vote to ordain Scott Anderson as he declared a scruple to the application at least some of the ordination standards as outlined in Section G-0106(b) [sic] to his own life.

This interpretation of the Knox Al, as it applies to Section G-0106(b), [sic] cannot be sustained under our polity. In this case, such an application has effectively allowed a Presbytery to invalidate or amend Section G-0106(b). [sic] We do not believe that any governing body, including the General Assembly, through the authoritative interpretation process as provided under G-13.0103(r) can, directly or indirectly, amend an express provision of the Book or Order.

The ordination standards as provided in Section G-0106(b) [sic] have engendered continuing conflict in our denomination and we acknowledge that Presbyterians in good faith have deep disagreement as to the wisdom if these standards. However, the only forum for a change to this Section is by and through our presbyteries, not through the use of authoritative interpretations.

(And in case you did not figure it out, for that persistent typographical error in the dissent the reference should be G-6.0106(b))

Not much more to say in this case.  The decision and dissent are both direct and concise and the reasoning is very similar to the Parnell decision.   Considering the timing, similarities, and parallel natures of these cases it is reasonable to expect that if they are both appealed, and the General Assembly Permanent Judicial Commission accepts them, that they would be heard and decided in the same session, probably next Spring.  Stay tuned…

Another Step In The Journey — Synod PJC Decision In Parnell And Others v. Presbytery Of San Francisco

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It strikes many Presbyterians with surprise, that the General Assembly… should be largely occupied in discussing the question… They ask with displeasure, “Are fundamentals never to be settled among us? Is the church never to be relieved of these debates, which thus agitate the settled foundations of our theory?” We may answer to these indignant questions with an emphatic No. The good brethren who thus deplore these renewed discussions of first principles misconceive the nature of the human mind and of free institutions. While man remains the creature he is, such discussions are to be expected and desired. Each generation must do its own thinking, and learn for itself its own lessons in first truths and general principles. If we insist that this generation of Presbyterians shall hold our fathers’ principles on trust, and by mere prescription, the result will be that they will not hold them sincerely at all.

I will let you live with that quote for a few minutes.  (If the curiosity is killing you about who said it and when then jump to the end or do a web search for it.) In a sense this quote is timeless and maybe captures the unique nature of Presbyterianism better than any other I know.  And while there has been some recent discussion and lamenting about how slowly our polity can move, the truth is that for a church that is supposed to embody a covenant community we do move slowly because it is about discerning God’s will through the journey of the whole community.  You may remember that in the PC(USA)’s predecessors, women were not ordained as deacons until American Presbyterianism was into its third century (1906), it was another 24 years until women were ordained as ruling elders, and then an additional 26 for ordination as teaching elders.  Changes in ordination standards are slow in moving and as one widely-cited GAPJC ordination decision from 1975 testifies, these issues may still be unsettled decades later.

So, the decision from the Permanent Judicial Commission of the Synod of the Pacific that was released last week should be viewed as one little step in the larger context of the community’s discernment that has been on-going and is not yet complete.

I ultimately want to comment on the decision, and while I hesitate to once again recite the background that this decision comes out of, let me at least briefly remind those that don’t follow this debate as closely as some of us polity wonks of a few of the important background points that are applicable here:

First, while there have been multiple amendments sent to the presbyteries to try to remove or modify the ordination standards section in the Book of Order, also know as the “fidelity and chastity” section, G-6.0106b still remains a constitutional standard for ordination.  Yes, another amendment is being sent to the presbyteries this year but to date the collective discernment of the denomination has been to keep the standard.

Second, with the adoption of the Report of the Theological Task Force on Peace, Unity and Purity in 2006  the 217th General Assembly adopted an Authoritative Interpretation (AI) that included the following section on applying the standards to those seeking ordination:

c. Ordaining and installing bodies, acting as corporate expressions of the church, have the responsibility to determine their membership by applying these standards to those elected to office. These determinations include:

(1) Whether a candidate being examined for ordination and/or installation as elder, deacon, or minister of Word and Sacrament has departed from scriptural and constitutional standards for fitness for office,
(2) Whether any departure constitutes a failure to adhere to the essentials of Reformed faith and polity under G-6.0108 of the Book of Order, thus barring the candidate from ordination and/or installation.

The AI then goes on to say that one governing body’s application of the standards is reviewable by higher governing bodies.

In response to this AI some presbyteries passed policies about what are essentials, but in the Bush decision the General Assembly Permanent Judicial Commission (GAPJC) ruled that there could not be blanket policies, but rather candidates must be considered on a case-by-case basis.  However, in that ruling the GAPJC also stated that:

“Under our polity, violations of behavioral standards are to be addressed through repentance and reconciliation, not by exception or exemption. The freedom of conscience granted in G-6.0108 allows candidates to express disagreement with the wording or meaning of provisions of the constitution, but does not permit disobedience to those behavioral standards.” The fidelity and chastity provision may only be changed by a constitutional amendment. Until that occurs, individual candidates, officers, examining and governing bodies must adhere to it.

The 218th General Assembly (2009) chose to issue a new Authoritative Interpretation that clarified the intent of the PUP Report as expressed in the rational, which was not binding.  This AI contradicted parts of the GAPJC Bush decision and rendered those sections void.  The AI said:

The 218th General Assembly (2008) affirms the authoritative interpretation of G-6.0108 approved by the 217th General Assembly (2006). Further, the 218th General Assembly (2008), pursuant to G-13.0112, interprets the requirements of G-6.0108 to apply equally to all ordination standards of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.). Section G-6.0108 requires examining bodies to give prayerful and careful consideration, on an individual, case-by-case basis, to any departure from an ordination standard in matters of belief or practice that a candidate may declare during examination. However, the examining body is not required to accept a departure from standards, and cannot excuse a candidate’s inability to perform the constitutional functions unique to his or her office (such as administration of the sacraments).”

This AI was based upon an overture to the 218th GA from the Presbytery of John Knox and has acquired the informal title “Knox Authoritative Interpretation” or “Knox AI,” a title propagated in the decision we are about to look at to distinguish it from the earlier “PUP AI.”  The original overture from Knox carries the title “On Adopting an Authoritative Interpretation of G-6.0108 to Ensure Proper Application of Ordination Standards.”

The third perforatory point I want to make is that although there have been several GAPJC decisions related to ordination standards all of them have dealt with procedural matters and issues of timing.  Specifically, the earlier cases have clarified that a statement of departure must be made by the candidate and assessed by the presbytery at the time of their examination for ordination.  Specific to this case GAPJC decision 219-11 (Naegeli and others v. Presbytery of San Francisco) specified that examination on a departure must take place at the time of examination for ordination.

While the brief (yes, for this issue that is brief) review above may be familiar to many of my readers, I include it here because in my discussion that follows there are points that refer to these pieces of the past history.

It is important to remember that up to this point all of the case history of all of the judicial cases dealing with declaring exceptions to ordination standards are related to the process of doing so and rulings have not been rendered related to a specific candidate’s declared exceptions and how the presbytery has dealt with them.  That is what makes this new decision different.

This new case, Eric Parnell, Bruce McIntosh, Cordelia Shieh, Margaret Gelini, Greg Roth, Marsha Roth, Randy Young, and the Session of Walnut Creek Presbyterian Church, Complainants, v. The Presbytery of San Francisco, Respondent, is a remedial case brought by the complainants following the November 10, 2009, examination for ordination of candidate Lisa Larges.  This was the court of first impression and the Synod of the Pacific PJC heard testimony on the case and in a 5-4 decision did not sustain any of the five specifications of error.  The minority submitted an extensive dissent in which they disagree with the majority on four of the five specifications.

The ruling of the majority can actually be summed up very succinctly:  The presbytery’s actions were consistent with the current Authoritative Interpretation and the previous GAPJC rulings.

The dissenting opinion is a bit more complicated but I would summarize that as: While the facts in the case are not in dispute there are essentials of faith and polity here for which exceptions should not be granted.

Now, if all you wanted was the executive summary you can move on and I invite the polity wonks to stick around and see if you concur with my analysis of the decision.

Let me begin with the fourth specification of error, the one everyone agreed not to sustain.  That specification was that the presbytery erred in granting a departure to G-6.0106b “because departures can only be granted with regard to the interpretation of Scripture, not conduct.”  The relevant section of the Book of Order here is G-6.0108b:

b. It is to be recognized, however, that in becoming a candidate or officer of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) one chooses to exercise freedom of conscience within certain bounds. His or her conscience is captive to the Word of God as interpreted in the standards of the church so long as he or she continues to seek or hold office in that body. The decision as to whether a person has departed from essentials of Reformed faith and polity is made initially by the individual concerned but ultimately becomes the responsibility of the governing body in which he or she serves. (G-1.0301; G-1.0302)

This looks like a good call on the part of the PJC because while the most recent AI addresses behavior this section does not place Scripture and conduct in this context.

Now considering the specifications of error which the PJC disagreed on – The first was that the candidate’s refusal to abide by G-6.0106b, a constitutional requirement, was equivalent to answering “No” to the fifth constitutional question for ordination about being “governed by our church’s polity.”  The second was that wishing to be exempted from G-6.0106b is “a serious departure from Reformed faith or polity.” The third specification of error was that the the presbytery was wrong to grant the exception because “such an act obstructs the constitutional governance of the church.”  Finally, the last error was that the exception that was granted “exceeds the bounds of freedom of conscience for one who seeks to hold office in the PC(USA).”

In answering all of these the prevailing decision references the most recent AI, the “Knox AI,” to argue that the process the presbytery followed complied with the current interpretations of the Book of Order.  Regarding whether the declared objection was “a serious departure” the decision says, in part:

In the absence of a preponderance of evidence showing that Presbytery erred in its decision to accept the candidate’s departure, this SPJC accepts the Presbytery’s decision that the candidate’s departure did not constitute a failure to adhere to the essentials of Reformed faith and polity. (p. 4)

So, given the evidence at trial, and lacking strong evidence to the contrary, the SPJC finds no errors in the presbytery’s process and finds no reason to overturn their collective decision on the matter.

While the actual decision portion of the prevailing decision takes up about two pages, the dissenting opinion takes just over four pages.  The heart of the decision is the discussion of the second and third error specifications combined.  They begin their argument from the testimony of the expert witnesses for both sides:

From the testimony heard we conclude that the preponderance and emphasis of scripture supports the conclusion that the unanimous witness of both Old and New Testament is that fidelity in marriage and chastity in singleness are Reformed mandates to be applied to those called to leadership in the Church. “Now the overseer must be above reproach, the husband of but one wife, temperate, self-controlled, respectable…” [I Timothy 3:2]. Many other texts, Old and New Testaments, confirm this conclusion, such as Genesis 2:24, Genesis 18:20ff, Mark 10:10, Romans 1:26-31, I Corinthians 6:9-10, Jude 7, to mention only a few. No texts suggest that fidelity in marriage or chastity in singleness are in violation of Scripture or that infidelity in marriage or sexual activity in singleness are consistent and supported in Scripture.

For the Candidate to separate her actions from Biblical truth is a serious departure from Reformed faith. (p. 7)

They then go on to review the PUP AI and then discuss the examination process:

In this case, the facts are clear and undisputed. The Candidate for ordination to the office of Minister of Word and Sacrament appeared upon the floor of the Presbytery of San Francisco, and during her ordination examination, declared a departure pursuant to G-6.0108 using the process described in the PUP AI, specifically in section c(2).

In her Statement of Departure, the Candidate declared that she was bound by her conscience to reject the authority of G-6.0106b, with respect to the “requirement to live either in fidelity within the covenant of marriage between and man and a woman (W-4.9001), or chastity in singleness.” She expressly declared, “By my conscience, faith, and theology, I cannot and will not accept the terms of this standard”.

Each party to this matter urges divergent scriptural and constitutional interpretations but neither party contests the operative facts of this case. In a like manner, neither party asserts any deficiency in the process of the presbytery in arriving at its decision in this matter.

We are therefore squarely faced with the determination as a matter of law or polity whether the departure of the Candidate was a serious failure to adhere to the essentials of the Reformed faith as expressed in the constitution.

We find that it was.

When it comes to the living of one’s life there may be considerable divergence of opinion of what it means to live one’s life “in obedience to scripture and conformity to the historic confessional standards of the church.” We may not have, nor may it be desirable to have, an exhaustive list of what those standards are. But we know one of them. The second sentence of G-6.0106b emphatically declares that it is the “requirement to live either in fidelity within the covenant of marriage between a man and a woman or chastity in singleness” [italics added]. The language of the Constitution specifically and explicitly declares that requirement to be among the historic confessional standards of the church. (p. 8-9)

They finish this section by arguing for, and concluding, that the most recent AI and the Book of Order are at odds here.  “G-6.0106b and the Knox AI cannot both be honored in this case.” (p. 9)  Without citing the Bush decision they echo Bush where that decision says:

While the General Assembly and the GAPJC may interpret these standards, the Authoritative Interpretation did not (and constitutionally could not) change any ordination standard, including the requirements set forth in G-6.0106b. Similarly, no lower governing body can constitutionally define, diminish, augment or modify standards for ordination and installation of church officers. (p. 5)

and again from Bush:

The SPJC correctly stated that the fidelity and chastity provision of G-6.0106b is a mandatory standard that cannot be waived…. Presbyteries do not have the authority to restate or define such standards. (p. 7)

As I said, that is the heart of the dissent.  For error 1 the minority briefly argues that answering a constitutional question by saying “yes, except for…” is essentially saying no.  For error 5 the dissenting opinion appeals to the preceding argument about essential standards to say that if something is indeed essential, than rejecting it does exceed the bounds of conscience.

Finally, it is important to note the comment attached to the decision that, in part, says:

Given the importance of these issues to the instant parties, this Commission and the larger church body, we look forward to the GAPJC’s guidance and direction. This Commission joins with the parties of Bierschwale II in imploring the GAPJC to rule on the continued authority of Bush v. Presbytery of Pittsburgh (Minutes 218-10, p.319) in light of the 2008 Authoritative Interpretation on G-6.0108b.

Well, the complainants have stated that they intend to appeal so a stay is in place for 45 days to give the complainants time to file the appeal and the GAPJC time to accept it.  This raises an interesting question about the appeal timeline and the voting on the amendment to G-6.0106b — Might an appeal be rendered moot and denied when no remedy is necessary if the amendment were to pass?  On the other hand, are these issues important enough and general enough that a GAPJC decision would be useful regardless of any changes to the constitution because the section at issue is actually G-6.0108 and not the “fidelity and chastity” language?

If you are interested in other coverage of the decision you can find it in all the usual places: Presbyterian News, The Outlook, The Layman , and the Covenant Network.

And two brief additional comments: 1) The 5-4 vote by the SPJC was in very similar proportions as the 156 to 138 presbytery vote to sustain the candidate’s examination.  (56% to 44% compared to 53% to 47%)  2) Counsel representing the complainants included Mary Naegeli who was the lead complainant on the earlier case I mentioned in this sequence, Naegeli and others v. San Francisco Presbytery.

So that is my take on this decision and the status of declared departures in the PC(USA).  Of course, declared departures and “scruples” are nothing new being almost as old as American Presbyterianism itself.  But once again, even as the denomination looks at adding to its confessional standards, there is the necessary discussion about what is an acceptable departure from the essentials of the Reformed faith.

And that quote at the beginning of this piece?  It may or may not surprise you that it is 150 years old – a point in time almost exactly half-way between the beginnings of American Presbyterianism and today.  We keep on arguing, but we have been for 300 years.  Polity takes time, struggle, and a willingness to be in discussion, discernment and prayer as we seek the will of God together.

And so for completeness I leave you with the full, unedited, opening line from Robert Dabney in his essay “Theories of the Eldership.”

It strikes many Presbyterians with surprise, that the General Assembly and our leading periodicals in this year 1860, one hundred and fifty years after the beginning of our church in America, should be largely occupied in discussing the question, “What is Presbyterianism?”