Category Archives: PJC decision

Presbytery PJC Decision In Redwoods v. Spahr (2010)

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The last three days the Permanent Judicial Commission of Redwoods Presbytery has been hearing arguments in the disciplinary case of Redwoods Presbytery v. Jane Adams Spahr.  The Rev. Spahr is accused of conducting ceremonies for same-sex couples that are prohibited by the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) but were legal civil marriages under the laws of the State of California at the time.  If this sounds familiar it is — this is a variant on the case filed against Rev. Spahr in 2004 that lead to General Assembly PJC Decision 218-12 that gave us the, shall we say interesting, decision that the Rev. Spahr could not have been guilty of conducting same-sex marriages because “The SPJC found Spahr guilty of doing that which by definition cannot be done. One cannot characterize same sex ceremonies as marriages for the purpose of disciplining a minister of the Word and Sacrament and at the same time declare that such ceremonies are not marriages for legal or ecclesiastical purposes.”  It may be a unique legal decision, but it is the prevailing interpretation on this subject and figures in the Commission decision.

This Commission sustained three of the four charges against Rev. Spahr, all related to the authority of the Book of Order and her persisting in preforming these ceremonies after the previous GAPJC decision.  But the Commission also weighed in with their judgment about the current polity situation in the the PC(USA).

Before I get to a discussion of the decision, I want to make a couple of observations about the trial itself.

One aspect of this trial is that it was probably the first one with significant real-time commentary on Twitter.  You can find most of the tweets under @revjanespahr and #revjanie.

It was interesting to follow the trial play-by-play, but as with most things on Twitter these days it also came with the attendant amount of snark, such as: “Oh God, she just mentioned the ‘silent majority.'” and “Blackstone: Same old same old — GAPJC.”  I would also note that virtually all of the tweets I saw were from Rev. Spahr’s supporters with none, that I saw, from anyone clearly supporting the prosecution.  Maybe I just didn’t find the hashtag.

A couple of items came across in the tweets that I wanted to comment on.
1) The argument that the Directory for Worship is descriptive and that it contains no “shalls.”  This was the argument that carried the day in a Presbytery PJC decision that acquitted the Rev. Jean Southard in a similar case in Boston Presbytery.  However, on appeal the Synod PJC found that the Presbytery PJC was in error in this reasoning and we await a General Assembly PJC case to clarify this.  But I will also say that after serving on the Special Committee on Civil Unions and Religious Marriage I came away with the understanding that W-4.9001 was the equivalent of a “shall” section and that is why I wanted to recommend to the General Assembly wording to make the civil marriage section of the definition more flexible.

2) Also related to the Special Committee and the definition, I think several of us on the Committee, myself included, came away from the study wondering if the church should be acting as the agent of the state in executing marriage licenses.  In my own experience I know that in such diverse settings as Mexico and Germany the civil marriage and the religious marriage are two distinct events with the religious ceremony possibly happening minutes or years after the civil ceremony.  This concept came up in this trial, based on the tweets, with arguments by the defense that the two are linked in the Book of Order and by the prosecution that they are not.  At least that is what I gathered from two 140 character messages.

Anyway, with that as preface, and with the understanding that this case probably has two appeals to go before it is settled, what did Redwoods Presbytery PJC give us this time?

Charge 1 was that Rev. Spahr solemnized a marriage “in direct violation of the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) (GAPJC) in its Decision and Order in Disciplinary Case 218-12.”  This effectively says that W-4.0991 is a constitutionally binding requirement of the Book of Order.

Charge 2 was that Rev. Spahr “persisted in a pattern or practice of disobedience concerning the aforementioned authoritative interpretation of the Book of Order.”  In other words, since the previous GAPJC decision she had conducted multiple same-gender marriages.

Charge 3 was that Rev. Spahr “By intentionally and repeatedly acting in violation of the above-referenced authoritative interpretation of the Book of Order as set forth in Disciplinary Case 218-12, you, JANE ADAMS SPAHR, failed to be governed by polity of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), in violation of your ordination vows (W-4.4003e).”

These three charges were sustained by the Commission on a 4-2 vote.

The fourth charge was unanimously not sustained: By publicly, intentionally and repeatedly acting in violation of the Book of Order, you, JANE ADAMS SPAHR, have failed to further the peace, unity, and purity of the church (W-4.4003g).

OK, that is the verdict.  Expect an appeal and another trip to the GAPJC. (And expect mainstream media reports to miss the nuances of the polity.)

What is most interesting about the decision is the second page with the commentary by the Commission.  They begin:

The Permanent Judicial Commission, in sustaining the first three charges, recognizes that while the Rev. Dr. Jane Spahr has indeed performed these marriages, which were and continue to be legal marriages, she did so acting with faithful compassion in accord with W7.3004. These marriages were legal in the State of California, being civil contracts (W4.9001), and are different from same sex ceremonies. The testimonies of those at court clearly demonstrated this difference.

We commend Dr. Spahr and give thanks for her prophetic ministry that for 35 years has extended support to “people who seek the dignity, freedom and respect that they have been denied” (W7.4002c), and has sought to redress “wrongs against individuals, groups, and peoples in the church, in this nation, and in the world” (W7.4002h).

But their commentary goes on as a word for the whole church:

In addition, we call upon the church to reexamine our own fear and ignorance that continues to reject the inclusiveness of the Gospel of Jesus Christ.(G3.0401c) We say this believing that we have in our own Book of Order conflicting and even contradictory rules and regulations that are against the Gospel.

But the decision concludes with these words:

Notwithstanding the foregoing, we are constrained to accept that the following language in GAPJC Disciplinary Case 218-12 is authoritative and should be followed until and unless modified: “We further hold that the officers of the PCUSA authorized to perform marriages shall not state, imply or represent that a same sex ceremony is a marriage. Under W4.9001, a same sex ceremony is not and cannot be a marriage.”

and

We implore the Synod and General Assembly levels of our church to listen to these testimonies, which are now part of this record, to take them to heart, and to do what needs to be done to move us as a church forward on this journey of reconciliation.

The penalty imposed is censure with rebuke (D-12.0102) and she is “enjoined to avoid such offenses in the future.”  If the decision is appealed the censure is held until the completion of the process if this decision is upheld.  Censure with rebuke is the lightest option available to the Commission and is effectively a formal declaration that what she did went against the constitution of the PC(USA).

Addendum:  A couple of additional words of commentary on this decision.  I waited a few hours to add this both to give me time to think about it and because I thought the decision pretty much spoke for itself. But to cast this in light of our polity the members of the PJC walked the fine line between “God alone is Lord of the conscience” [G-1.0301a] and “It is necessary to the integrity and health of the church that the persons who serve in it as officers shall adhere to the essentials of the Reformed faith and polity as expressed in The Book of Confessions and the Form of Government.” [G-6.0108a]  Their commentary clearly, to me at least, reflects their personal frustration that while they agree with the pastoral care Rev. Spahr has carried out and disagree with the applicable sections of the Constitution and the current interpretations, the majority none-the-less recognized their obligation to abide by the current standards enacted by the majority.  One can object to the strength or extent to which the PJC majority expressed their personal beliefs, but one must admire and appreciate their faithfulness to the PC(USA) process and connectionalism.  So yes, they effectively said “These are the rules, you have broken the rules, we think the rules are wrong but we must still find you guilty.”  This was further expressed in the penalty, which is the lightest that can be imposed and is effectively saying “Go and sin no more.”

Also in contemplating this decision the question keeps coming round of what specifications of error could be cited as grounds for appeal?  Since the defense seems to have focused on the idea that W-4.9001 is descriptive and prescriptive, that is that there is no “shall” language in there, that is certain to be one of the points.  This has been discussed for a while now and it will be useful if the GAPJC does provide guidance on what it means for the Directory for Worship to be descriptive.  From what I have seen and heard I don’t think I can pick out any procedural points that would be grounds for appeal but I did not follow extremely closely.  I don’t think that either personal conscience or the difference between civil and ecclesiastical definitions of marriage would be strong points of appeal.

Expecting an appeal, or possibly a decision in the Southard case that could impact this one, it is far too early to say this is the final word on this decision and this issue.  However, it does highlight where the PC(USA) is right now with different understandings on marriage and the fact that there needs to be a recognition that same-gender marriages are legally recognized in some jurisdictions and countries.  As the Special Committee report said…

We can not agree

but

By the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, with the love of God, and in the communion of the Holy Spirit, we covenant together to:

• Honor the truth that Christ has called and God works through each member;

• Listen to one another with openness and respect;

• Support and pray for each other and for one another’s ministries;

• Earnestly seek and carefully listen to each person’s discernment of God’s will found in Scripture;

• Struggle together with perseverance to find God’s will for us even when the way is difficult;

• Love one another even when we disagree, and to commit ourselves to the reconciliation of any broken relationships we have with one another;

• Honor who we are as Presbyterians by respecting the fallible discernment of the body, bearing in mind that individual conscience, held captive to the word of God, cannot be thus bound.

Presbytery Judicial Decision In A Same-sex Marriage Case

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Two weeks ago, on August 22, the Permanent Judicial Commission of the Presbytery of Boston Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) heard the disciplinary case of Presbytery of Boston versus Jean K. Southard.  The Rev. Southard was charged with 1) conducting a public worship service that was effectively a marriage ceremony for a same-sex couple and 2) by doing so violating her ordination vows.

The decision of the PJC was that the charges were not sustained and the Rev. Southard was found not guilty.  (Thanks to Church and World, aka PresbyWeb, for publishing the decision.)

The reasoning of the majority was expressed as follows:

The Prosecuting Committee has not proven beyond reasonable doubt that W-4.9000 contains mandatory language that would prohibit a Minister of Word and Sacrament from performing a same-gender marriage.
Since the Preface to the Directory of Worship (clause b) states that the Directory uses language that is “simply descriptive”, this Commission takes this to mean that the definition of Christian marriage in W-4.9001 is merely descriptive; there is no mandatory language in this article.

And continues

In addition, there is no mandatory language in the Constitution, nor in any Authoritative Interpretation, prohibiting Ministers of Word and Sacrament from performing same-gender marriages in states where this is allowed by law.

Note carefully the wording — The decision was not about whether a same-sex marriage was preformed, but given that it was preformed is that prohibited by the constitution and therefore cause for discipline?

There is a Dissenting Dpinion that begins:

In rendering this decision, the majority has taken the liberty of legislating change in the Constitution through the judicial process. W-4.9001 definitely does define marriage as being between a man and a woman.

Later says

Because of this changed legal state in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (The General Laws of Massachusetts, Chapter 207), the importance of the definitions within the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) become more important, not less so. Further, the argument that the definition of marriage being between a man and a woman is only descriptive and reflects the ideals and mores of a bygone age cannot be sustained. The claim stands without proof, and can only be maintained through dependence on the argument from silence. This sets a dangerous precedent, that any part of the Constitution that has not recently been sustained by legislative action can be assumed to have lost validity. In the absence of that legislative action, the commission has substituted its judgment for the clear words of definition. This makes a mockery of the prescriptive language of W-4.9004, wherein the Directory for Worship orders that “The man and the woman shall declare their intention to enter into Christian marriage and shall exchange vows of love and faithfulness.”; and “In the name of the triune God the minister shall declare publicly that the woman and the man are now joined in marriage.”

And concludes:

We disagree with the commission decision and do not join in it. While we find that Rev. Southard found herself in a difficult position given the request of two valued elders of her church, we do not find that tension to be sufficient reason to grant release from the strictures of the discipline of the Constitution. Her action of social justice came at the cost of her obedience to her ordination vows, (W-4.4003e), and created a situation that worked against the peace, unity and purity of the Church.

Three other important points in this case:  1) According to the Dissenting Opinion the facts of the case were not contested.  Both sides stipulated and “provided and accepted evidence that this was intentionally a Christian marriage.”  2)  Note that the participants in this ceremony are both described as elders in that church, leading to…  3) This was a disciplinary case against the pastor.  While there is no indication that additional cases are contemplated, disciplinary cases against the two elders who were married and a remedial case against the session would be possible, but unlikely, especially in light of the decision in this case.

OK, that presents a summary of what I see as the key points of the decision.  If you are not a GA Junkie, you can probably stop reading now.  However, as a GA Junkie, I want to dissect this decision a bit and make some comments.

There seem to be two distinctives to this case that distinguish it from previous cases.  One of these is that the worship service was held in the church sanctuary and, as the charge implies, had all the distinctions of a wedding ceremony.  The second is that this is the first case brought to trial where a same-sex marriage was preformed in a state that allows civil same-sex marriage.  (But I would point out that one of the withdrawn charges in the Spahr case (218-12) was a same-sex marriage preformed in Ontario, Canada, where civil marriage is legal.)

Now I will acknowledge from the onset that the PC(USA) has a problem right now with its definition of marriage.  This case hinged on that section of the Directory for Worship (W-4.9001):

Marriage is a gift God has given to all humankind for the well-being of the entire human family. Marriage is a civil contract between a woman and a man. For Christians marriage is a covenant through which a man and a woman are called to live out together before God their lives of discipleship. In a service of Christian marriage a lifelong commitment is made by a woman and a man to each other, publicly witnessed and acknowledged by the community of faith.

Clearly now with a few states permitting civil same-sex marriages the part that reads “a civil contract between a woman and a man” has certain problems.  That will have to be addressed by the next General Assembly.

That problematic phrase was the main point that the PJC appears to have focused on, and they did so in two ways.

Their first argument was that unless the Directory for Worship uses language making something mandatory, like the wording of vows or formulae for sacraments, then the Directory is “descriptive.”

That the Directory is in a sense descriptive is certainly true, and as they point out it says so in the Preface.  Section b reads:

b. In addition to the terms defined in the Preface to the Book of Order, this directory also uses language about worship which is simply descriptive.

But what does it mean to be descriptive?  Look at the preceding section a, which says in part:

A Directory for Worship is not a service book with fixed orders of worship, a collection of prayers and rituals, or a program guide. Rather it describes the theology that underlies Reformed worship and outlines appropriate forms for that worship. This directory suggests possibilities for worship, invites development in worship, and encourages continuing reform of worship. It sets standards and presents norms for the conduct of worship in the life of congregations and the governing bodies of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.). As the constitutional document ordering the worship of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), this Directory for Worship shall be authoritative for this church.

Note some of the things that the Directory does:  “describes the theology that underlies Reformed worship,” “sets standards,” “presents norms,” and “shall be authoritative for thi
s church.”  The majority decision seems to equate “descriptive” with “optional.”  The first few lines I quoted would seem to equate “descriptive” with “not a service book with fixed orders of worship, a collection of prayers and rituals, or a program guide.”  In fact, a widely used book on Presbyterian polity co-authored by Joan Gray (former GA Moderator) and Joyce Tucker says “The Directory for Worship contains our standards relating to worship…” (Presbyterian Polity for Church Officers, p. 7) and later “…it has now become part of the standards of our church.” (p. 172)  I read and understand the Directory for Worship to be “flexible” not “optional.”  And that flexibility would be in form but not in function.

In the Dissenting Opinion section I quote above there is also a clear argument for the applicability and mandatory nature of W-4.9001 when the refer to W-4.9004 and the prescriptive nature of that section which does use the “shall” language and refers to “the man and the woman.”

Finally, the prescriptive nature of W-4.9001 is reinforce by the Spahr decision which regularly, including in the Headnotes, says that “Marriage is defined” by this section.  As this present decision points out there are certain procedural issues with leaning on the Spahr decision too heavily, but the Spahr decision presents this definition not as their conclusion, but as a given, the accepted starting point from which they draw the conclusion that in light of this definition there can be no such thing as same-sex Christian marriage.

The second part of the majority’s argument was that not only was it not mandatory to begin with, but since conditions in the civil sphere were not in alignment with one part of the section then the whole section could be safely ignored.  Furthermore, they argued that the situation in this case was different enough that the conclusion in the Spahr decision was not applicable.  This strikes me as saying that civil law will determine theology and doctrine.

The signatories to the dissenting opinion strongly disagreed with this assertion.  However, I think they overlook an important additional argument.  In response to the majority argument that the laws of the State of Massachusetts have rendered this section of the Directory for Worship moot, they say:

This sets a dangerous precedent, that any part of the Constitution that has not recently been sustained by legislative action can be assumed to have lost validity. In the absence of that legislative action, the commission has substituted its judgment for the clear words of definition. (emphasis mine)

I would argue that the definition of Christian marriage being between a man and a women was upheld twice by the most recent General Assembly, even after Massachusetts had adopted civil marriage.  In response to an overture from the Presbytery of Baltimore the assembly voted 540-161 not to change “a man and a woman” in W-4.9001 to “two people.”  And again, in the action that created the Special Committee on Civil Unions and Christian Marriage the Assembly added the sentence “This overtures advocates for equal rights and does not seek to redefine the nature of Christian marriage.”  To me this is strong evidence that even with the presence of same-sex civil marriage there was Assembly endorsement of the man and woman language for Christian marriage.  In light of that I have trouble accepting the argument that if one clause does not apply then none of it applies.

Regarding the Spahr decision, it is clear that in a legal sense it can not serve as precedent in this present case.  In the present case the alleged actions took place on March 1, 2008, which was almost two months before the GAPJC ruled in the Spahr case.  In addition, as both the majority and minority decisions point out, application of the Benton decision (212-11) to this case is tricky because this is a disciplinary case and Benton was remedial.

In my mind there are clear grounds for appeal on the basis of an error in constitutional interpretation.  However, I also recognize that the circumstances of civil marriages make the Directory definition a problem that the next General Assembly will have to address.  Therefore it may be advisable to simply let this constitutional issue be addressed legislatively rather than have a legislative and judicial interpretation proceeding in parallel.

I think that does it.  Those are my thoughts on this case.  Your mileage may vary.

Pittsburgh PJC Decision Appears To Be Based on Spahr v Redwoods

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(See the evening update at the end of the post)

Word is being relayed on the internet that in the Pittsburgh Presbytery PJC case, where the Rev. Janet Edwards was being tried for conducting a same-sex wedding, the PJC unanimously acquitted her.  (More Light Presbyterians, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette) While the full decision is not available yet the early indications are that this decision was based upon the confusing decision in the Spahr v. Redwoods case and I have trouble seeing how anyone can claim a real victory in this case.  (If you want the background check out my post from August on the topic.)

To quote the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette’s early report:

The court, meeting on the North Side in the second day of a trial for
the Rev. Janet Edwards, ruled that the constitutions of the church and
the state of Pennsylvania define marriage as an act between a man and a
woman. Therefore, judges said, the minister could not have done what
she was accused of doing.

This appears to be based on the decision rendered in the GA PJC Spahr v. Redwoods case that no minister in the Presbyterian Church can be found guilty of conducting a same-sex wedding ceremony because no such thing exists.  A wedding is between a man and a woman so a same-sex wedding is a contradiction in terms.  As you can probably guess this legal reasoning did not really satisfy anyone.

It seems reasonable to me that the lower Presbytery PJC relied on this legal decision, a reasonable thing to do even if it is not a particularly satisfying decision.  Hence, my feeling that there are no real winners in this case.  No new legal territory is broken and the situation is none the clearer.  From a personal perspective, the Rev. Edwards was cleared of the charges.  From a polity/legal point of view, the ceremony she openly admits conducting was not a wedding according to the PJC.  So guess what, we have to wait for another appeal, maybe not in this case though, to make its way to the top.

The Rev. Edwards, in her defense brief, said that she would invoke the Spahr v. Redwoods case, but certain of the other parts of the decision.  Be careful what you ask for because it looks like she got a clear decision that there are no same-sex weddings.

Finally, I see this case in the light of the previous GAPJC decisions.  Clearly the news media has not seen that yet and a lot of the “people in the pews” won’t see the connection either.  Because it lines up so closely with Spahr v. Redwoods I see this as pretty much a “non-decision” in terms of the big picture of resolving this issue.  But most of the Presbyterian world will not see the nuances in here.  Hold on tight for the stormy seas.

UPDATE – 8:30 PM:  The verdict has been posted by More Light Presbyterians and pretty much holds to my inference above with one significant exception:  The verdict makes it clear that the prosecution, with whom the burden of proof lies, did not prove their case.  The verdict does rely heavily on Spahr v. Redwoods and the says, in part:

“The Prosecuting Committee has failed to meet the burden of proof that the accused carried out a marriage ceremony at all.”

Pennsylvania
civil law defines marriage as male-female, so a marriage between two
women cannot be a marriage regardless of what occurred in the ceremony.
Because the Book of Order does not recognize a same-sex marriage, it cannot be an offense to attempt to do the impossible.

Therefore,
the commission does not find that the accused committed an offense by
performing a ceremony between two people of the same gender.

Also,
there is no evidence that the accused held out the ceremony as a
marriage. It could be inferred from the order of service, but it has
not been proved. The accused’s belief about whether the ceremony was a
marriage has not been proved, either.

The decision in Spahr
states that “one cannot construe same-sex ceremonies as marriages for
the purpose of disciplining someone, but not as marriages for ecclesial
purposes.”

It does leave open the question of whether this PJC would have convicted if better evidence had been presented, even though “it cannot be an offense to attempt to do the impossible.”

From reading this over if the evidence is not there I’m not sure that there are procedural grounds to appeal.  We will see if the prosecution thinks otherwise.

Synod PJC Lets Restoration To Ordained Ministry Stand

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A few days ago the Permanent Judicial Commission of the Synod of Lakes and Prairies dismissed the remedial complaint filed against the Presbytery of the Twin Cities Area regarding their restoration of the Rev. Paul Capetz to the practice of ordained ministry.  The Rev. Capetz is on the faculty of United Theological Seminary, an independent theological institution with a UCC heritage.  He had asked to be released in 2000 because he could not agree with Book of Order section G-6.0106b, the “fidelity and chastity” standard.  With the passage of the PUP Report he asked to be restored while declaring a scruple.  The Presbytery agreed in January and restored Mr. Capetz.  The complaint was then filed with the Synod PJC.  I’ve held off a couple of days hoping to get official language, but I have not found it yet so I’ll discuss this decision based on what was first reported by the Witherspoon Society.

According to the Witherspoon Society piece, the Synod PJC ruled that the Book of Order and interpretations by previous General Assembly PJC decisions all deal with the ordination process and since Mr. Capetz was previously ordained there was no basis for complaint.  I would also note that the Authoritative Interpretation resulting from the PUP report also deals principally with the ordination process, and that another GAPJC decision deals only with a call to employment in a PC(USA) entity.  In light of this precedent and case law this is a reasonable decision by the SPJC, even if it seems counter-intuitive based on all these previous decisions.  To determine a new interpretation on this particular circumstance will require appeal to the GAPJC or action by the General Assembly.

If you are interested there are a whole series of GAPJC decisions on this which have carved the lines fairly precisely.  As I list these I will usually rely on the very brief description found in the Annotated Book of Order.   One series of decisions has dealt with the ordination process.  The decision in 205-4: Gary J. LeTourneau et al v. Presbytery of the Twin Cities Area in 1993 made clear that a “self-affirmed practicing homosexual” (SAPH) may not be certified ready for ordination.  The prohibition on ordination was reaffirmed in 206-3: Hope Church v. Central Church in 1994, and in 218-04: George R. Stewart v. Mission Presbytery in 2008.  However, the GAPJC also made clear that if you are celibate you may be ordained based on 212-12: John S. Sheldon, et al., v. the Presbytery of West Jersey. And then in a couple of decisions that bridge between the two extremes, 214-5: Ronald L. Wier v. Session, Second Presbyterian Church of Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, and 215-8: Presbytery of San Joaquin v. The Presbytery of the Redwoods and Edgar T. Hart, Steve Nesheim, Larry Ballenger, Bill McDonald, Merle Wood, Rebecca Jordan-Irwin, and Kent A. Webber v. The Presbytery of the Redwoods, the GAPJC basically reaffirmed that orientation alone is not an impediment to ordination, but if there are reasonable grounds (not rumor) to believe the individual is a SAPH than the ordaining body is obligated to investigate this.

As far as ordination is concerned, these have all been related to the ordination process and the GAPJC has made it clear in 206-3: Hope Church v. Central Church in 1994, and reaffirmed in 211-2: Wier v. Session, Second Presbyterian Church of Fort Lauderdale, Florida that an ordination may not be annulled under these circumstances.  And the GAPJC did caution in 215-5: Daniel J. McKittrick v. The Session of the West End Presbyterian Church of Albany, New York not to rush the ordination or installation process to reach this end.

There is one other thread in the GAPJC decisions which is applicable here.  While an ordination may not be annulled in these cases, the GAPJC did say in 205-5: Ronald P. Sallade et al v. Presbytery of Genesee Valley in 1993, and reaffirmed in several of these other cases, that a SAPH, if ordained, may not be called to employment in a PC(USA) position that “presumes ordination.”  In the case of Mr. Capetz, he is employed by an independent theological institution and the presbytery validated that ministry.

As I skim through these previous decisions, it strikes me that there is no set precedent for restoration to ordained ministry.  (I’m sure you will let me know if I missed a paragraph somewhere.)  And while it does seem to go against the intent of many of these decisions, and of the recent 218-10: Randall Bush, Wayne Peck, and the Session of East Liberty Presbyterian Church v Presbytery of Pittsburgh, I see no reason under current decisions that the SPJC should not have dismissed it.  As I said before, the real test will be the GAPJC if it is appealed.  Time will tell.

PC(USA) GA PJC Decision in Spahr v. Redwoods Presbytery: Reaction and Analysis

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The publication Tuesday of the decision in the General Assembly Permanent Judicial Commission case 218-12, Jane Adams Spahr v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) through the Presbytery of Redwoods has had a variety of reactions.  Early popular media articles, like this Reuters article or this WHAM-TV piece, basically picked up the story that the Rev. Spahr was cleared of the charges against her.

However, as the day went on the sophistication of the popular media reporting increased and is catching up with the discerning comments of Presbyterians familiar with the issues.  Among the first out with a story was the Presbyterian News Service whose article referred to the decision as “complicated.”  In a statement about the decision the Acting Executive Presbyter/Stated Clerk of Redwood Presbytery, the Rev. Robert Conover, refers to the decision as “nuanced and lengthy.”  In her own statement, the Rev. Spahr expresses her gratitude for the GA PJC upholding the original decision by the Presbytery PJC.  Later articles, such as one by the San Francisco Chronicle, began to recognize that Rev. Spahr’s acquittal is only the easy part of the story and there is still more there. The Chronicle writes “The ambivalent ruling –
affirming the rights of gays and lesbians to have their relationships
sanctioned by the church but not considering them equal to those of
heterosexual couples – is likely to disappoint both sides in the debate.”  And on the KGO-TV web site they write “Tuesday’s ruling is a complicated, split decision. It essentially
clears Reverend Spahr of disciplinary charges, saying she can’t be
found guilty of doing that, which by definition, cannot be done — the
marriage of gay couples. However, they say no one should try it again.”

As for official reaction, the Office of the Stated Clerk on Tuesday updated the Advisory Opinion 7 on Ceremonies Blessing Same-Sex Relationships to reflect this new decision.

Reaction from the web and blogosphere is still developing.  Most progressive web sites that have posted something, like That All May Freely Serve and JustPresbys, are pretty much linking to or quoting other statements or reports.  In the next few days we are likely to see more official statements from these groups.  On his blog the Rev. Ray Bagnuolo recognizes this as a victory, but only a beginning for the cause of equality for LGBT individuals.  Finally, the Rev. John Shuck and the Rev. David Fischler on each of their respective blogs from very different ends of the theological spectrum call this an “odd” and “bazaar” decision.

After reading it through a few times I must agree with them.  After putting together the available pieces, it seems to me that this was a divided PJC and they made the effort to put together a central kernel that they could all affirm and then five of the twelve commission members put together a dissent to the other significant part of the decision.  In addition, there are three other concurring decisions that comment on other parts of the decision.

The real focal point of this decision is Specification of Error No. 1 and No. 2.  Error 1 is that the Synod PJC should not have concluded that same sex marriages are prohibited by Presbyterian polity and Error 2 is that Rev. Spahr committed a disciplinary offense.  The GA PJC recognized that the Book of Order in W-4.9001 and the 1991 Authoritative Interpretation (see Advisory Opinion 7) prohibit ceremonies that represent marriages between persons of the same sex but other commitment or blessing ceremonies are not prohibited.  They also cited that marriage is between a man and a women as stated in W-4.9001.  It would then appear that all of the members of the PJC agreed on the following statements:

The ceremonies that are the subject of this case were not marriages as the term is defined by W-4.9001. These were ceremonies between women, not between a man and a woman. Both parties acknowledged the ceremonies in question were not marriages as defined by the Book of Order.

The SPJC found Spahr guilty of doing that which by definition cannot be done. One cannot characterize same sex ceremonies as marriages for the purpose of disciplining a minister of the Word and Sacrament and at the same time declare that such ceremonies are not marriages for legal or ecclesiastical purposes.

The PPJC was correct in finding that by performing the two ceremonies at issue, Spahr did not commit an offense as charged. Therefore, the SPJC erred in determining that Spahr was guilty of violating W-4.9001 or the 1991 AI.

And at the end of the section the decision says:

In summary, Specification of Error No. 1 is not sustained because by definition, “marriage is . . . between a man and a woman.” (W-4.9001) Specification of Error No. 1 and Specification of Error No. 2 are sustained because W-4.9001 does not state a mandatory prohibition on performing a same sex ceremony. The charge was for performing a marriage ceremony, which by definition cannot be performed.

So, if I read this correctly the question is not whether you intend to conduct a ceremony that you are calling a marriage or view as being equivalent.  The question is whether you did conduct a marriage ceremony.  Since same-sex couples, by definition of W-4.9001, can not be in a relationship called marriage, it is impossible to conduct such a ceremony and therefor no charges can be filed.  (And it appears that by this logic can never be filed.) So “poof,” under PC(USA) polity there is now no such thing as same-sex marriage.

As I look at this decision, this seems to be the mental gymnastics that were necessary to get a unanimous decision.  In addition, the sentence “Both parties acknowledged the ceremonies in question were not marriages as defined by the Book of Order” appears to be carefully constructed to be conditional on the Book of Order definition because it is made clear in the history of the case that Rev. Spahr intended these to be marriages and the evidence includes the fact that she signed a “Certificate of Marriage” in each case.  Even now, in her statement following the decision, she consistently uses the term “marriage” to describe her ministry.

But if you look at the substantive parts quoted above the real emphasis is on Book of Order W-4.9001.  The dissenting opinion by five of the members of the commission takes issue with the additional verbiage in this section that tries to expand on W-4.9001 using the 1991 AI or a previous PJC decision.  W-4.9001 talks about marriage and always refers to it being between a man and a woman.  There is no reference to the ceremony itself in this section or to any other ceremonies that may be for same-sex couples.  Strictly the constitution does not prohibit or regulate same-sex ceremonies except to say they are not marriages.   The 1991 AI and the previous Benton decision do make reference to the ceremony, that it should not be the same as a marriage ceremony and that it would be improper to use the church for such a ceremony.  This decision in the Spahr case extends this by saying:

In holding that Spahr was not guilty as charged, this Commission does not hold that there are no differences between same sex ceremonies and marriage ceremonies. We do hold that the liturgy should be kept distinct for the two types of services. We further hold that officers of the PCUSA authorized to perform marriages shall not state, imply, or represent that a same sex ceremony is a marriage. Under W-4.9001, a same sex ceremony is not and cannot be a marriage.

The five members of the commission who signed the dissent take issue with this extension.  They argue:

In rendering its decision, the majority has taken the liberty of legislating in the guise of interpreting inconsistencies between W-4.9001 on the one hand, and the 1991 Al and this Commission’s decision in Benton v. Presbytery of Hudson River, Remedial Case 212-11 (2000), on the other hand. For the reasons stated herein, we respectfully concur in the result of the majority, but disagree with the decision of the majority to the extent that it rests on the 1991 AI or Benton.

This seems to hearken back to the recent GA PJC decisions on the 2006 AI concerning declarations of exceptions in ordinations.  The idea is that the constitution is primary and AI’s and PJC decisions should not be used to extend the reach of the constitution.

On the other side, three commissioners in a concurring opinion write, in total:

We join in the foregoing Decision and Order (Decision). We understand the Decision to be an authoritative interpretation of W-4.9001, to mea
n that officers of the PCUSA who are authorized to perform marriages shall not hereafter perform a same sex union ceremony in which or with respect to which such officer states, implies or represents to be a marriage or the equivalent thereof. While the Commission did not find Spahr guilty as charged herein, in part because her conduct occurred under prior authoritative interpretations, we understand that future noncompliance with the authoritative interpretation of the Decision will be considered to be a disciplinable offense.

So, now that it is in the books, you have been warned and don’t do it again.

For the polity wonks, an interesting polity point is that the GA PJC dismissed arguments base on Benton right from the start of the decision in the Preliminary Statement pointing out that Benton resulted from a remedial case and this was a disciplinary case so it was not relevant case law.  With the exception of reference to it in the dissent I have not found other reference to Benton in the rest of the decision section.

In the reasoning on Errors 1 and 2 the main opinion continues on for roughly another page discussing Rev. Spahr’s ministry and the part of marriage ceremonies in it.  It acknowledges her sense of call to “participate in a caring and compassionate ministry to persons who have been marginalized, who are faithful Christians, and who wish to be accepted in every way as full members of the body of Christ.”  It also says that the Rev. Spahr may consider herself acting in the role of a prophet to the church, and points out that the role of a prophet contains risks and carries consequences.  The decision goes on to say “It is the burden of a church officer to accept the consequences of his or her actions that are the ecclesiastical equivalent of civil disobedience.”  The third of the concurring opinions expands on this and the Book of Order basis for it, even further.

The rest of the decision is fairly routine, procedural, and straight-forward.  Most errors were rendered irrelevant once Rev. Spahr was cleared in the first section.  It was noted that for Error 3 there was no disciplinary action to be taken, but originally the Synod PJC was out of place imposing a punishment and it should have remanded the case back to the Presbytery PJC for the consequences.  And it noted that while Rev. Spahr on appeal had referred to the 2006 AI, that was irrelevant because that applied only to conscience issues related to ordination standards.  Error 6 also refers back to conscience but the decision replys “Submission to the current standards of the church may not always be comfortable, but it is not optional.”  Finally, Error 7 was about a member of the Presbytery PJC and whether they should have been disqualified from serving on the case.  The decision says it was correct to let them go ahead and serve but a concurring opinion says that while it may be procedurally correct, for the appearance of a fair decision disqualification would have been wise.

So that is the decision, but where does that leave us?  As one statement said, this seems to imply a “separate but equal” structure in the PC(USA).  The ceremonies just can not look the same.  Rev. Spahr says that she will continue conducting “marriages.”  It also seems like muddled case law that neither side in the debate will be comfortable with.  It seems ripe for clarification and expansion by a future GA PJC.  And the similar case of the Rev. Janet Edwards in Pittsburgh Presbytery is awaiting a trial date.  It will be interesting to see how this as case law influences that decision.

Breaking news: PC(USA) GA PJC finds for Spahr in Same-sex Unions Case

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The decision in the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) General Assembly Permanent Judicial Commission case 218-12, Spahr v. Presbytery of the Redwoods was issued shortly after noon Pacific Time.  The decision is posted.

Bottom line:  Rev. Jane Spahr was found not guilty of conducting “same-sex marriages.”

Quick and dirty summary of the legal reasoning:  The Book of Order prohibits same-sex weddings but permits blessing same-sex unions.  These were not weddings, there for Rev. Spahr should not be disciplined.  Here is a quote from the decision:

The ceremonies that are the subject of this case were not marriages as the term is defined by W-4.9001. These were ceremonies between women, not between a man and a woman. Both parties acknowledged the ceremonies in question were not marriages as defined by the Book of Order. It is not improper for ministers of the Word and Sacrament to perform same sex ceremonies. At least four times, the larger church has rejected overtures that would prohibit blessing the unions of same sex couples. By the definition in W-4.9001, a same sex ceremony can never be a marriage. The SPJC found Spahr guilty of doing that which by definition cannot be done. One cannot characterize same sex ceremonies as marriages for the purpose of disciplining a minister of the Word and Sacrament and at the same time declare that such ceremonies are not marriages for legal or ecclesiastical purposes.

Later in that section the PJC seems to reason their way out by saying “The charge was for preforming a marriage ceremony, which by definition cannot be preformed.”  It sounds like they are saying that no one can ever be found guilty of preforming a “same-sex marriage ceremony” because there is no such thing in Presbyterian polity.

Where does this leave us?  In my quick reading it appears that this decision has maintained the status quo:  no weddings but there may be blessings.

Reaction:  I have seen none yet but I suspect in the next couple of hours there will be a reasonable amount.  I would also guess that while there will be some approval on the progressive side that Rev. Spahr was acquitted, I also suspect that neither progressive nor conservative side will be satisfied because it appears that this decision dodges the issue of breaking ground and brings no additional clarity or precedent to what a “wedding” is.

My initial take:  The GA PJC seems to be operating in the same mode it has in other decisions by crafting a central body that the whole commission can sign on to.  This one appears a bit more frayed at the edges than the others because there are four minority reports, one of which dissents with regard to certain parts of the main decision.

Now, I’ll get back to work and analyze this decision in more detail on my commute home.  More later.

Federal Vision Controversy: Current Events and Judicial Decisions

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As I follow the developments of the Federal Vision Controversy I see that there have been a couple of recent events that make a new blog entry worthwhile.

The most significant of these are two associated rulings from the Presbyterian Church in America‘s (PCA) Standing Judicial Commission (SJC) in the two cases related to the Federal Vision controversy.  To make a long story very short… Central Carolina Presbytery complained to the GA to have the SJC investigate Steve Wilkins, pastor of Auburn Avenue Presbyterian Church in Monroe, LA, or at least to have his presbytery, the Louisiana Presbytery do it.  The SJC had the presbytery do it, the presbytery did it, and reported back to the SJC last spring that there was not a problem.  In the mean time the GA adopted the report critical of the Federal Vision/Auburn Avenue Theology.

With that as background, a couple of weeks ago the SJC unanimously decided these cases and they have just become available on the web on Puritan Board.  You can either read them in a post to the board with some interesting follow-up discussion or as links to documents on their server. ( Central Carolina complaint decision, Louisiana response decision, agreement to copyrights will be necessary)  And if my very crude description of events in the paragraph above makes no sense to you, each of the decisions has the respective time-lines in them in great detail.

To give a one-line description of the SJC decision:  Louisiana Presbytery did it right, but came to the wrong decision.

Now, the detailed version:
In the SJC Report on the Memorial from Central Carolina Presbytery the SJC originally found a year ago that Louisiana Presbytery had not properly “dealt with the allegations that TE Steven TE Wilkins’ views are out of accord at key points with the system of doctrine as summarized in the Westminster Confession of Faith and Larger and Shorter Catechisms” and as a result the Louisiana Presbytery “has not met its responsibilities under BCO 13-9.f and 40-4, 5, and thus has not adequately protected the peace and purity of the Church.”  The SJC then directed the presbytery to conduct an examination with six specific requirements.

Part II of this decision then examines the actions of the Louisiana Presbytery in response to the original decision.  The SJC found that while the presbytery complied with the directives of the SJC, they did not reach a decision “consistent with the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in America.”  And this is were we jump off to the second decision released…

In the presbytery action on the examination the vote was 13 to 8 to exonerate Pastor Wilkins.  Following the vote Teaching Elder (TE) James Jones filed a complaint that quickly found its way to the SJC.  TE Jones was joined by one additional Teaching Elder and five Ruling Elders.  The points in the complaint are that it is a matter for the GA, that TE Wilkins redefined theological terms, and that TE Wilkins had “serious variances” with the Westminster Standards.  This became the second SJC decision that was released.

In their decision, the SJC ruled that the Louisiana Presbytery had failed to apply the correct constitutional standard and that in doing so it had erred and should have found a strong presumption of guilt that some of TE Wilkins’ views were “out of conformity.”

Now, here is where I am not sure what happens next.  Problems were declared with Louisiana Presbytery and TE Wilkins, but I have not found in these decisions an order about what to do next.  I will keep looking around but my guess is that it will return to the GA and this year’s Assembly will determine the corrective action.  (Let me know if I missed this somewhere.)  It should also be noted that while the SJC found the strong probability that some of TE Wilkins’ theology is out of conformity, the actual decision only says that the presbytery did not use the correct standard.  The problem is not the Federal Vision theology itself but how the presbytery decided if there was a problem.  Judgment on the Federal Vision/Auburn Avenue theology has not been directly rendered.

In a related action, on his blog De Regnis Duobus (Concerning the Two Kingdoms) the Rev. Jason Stellman posts a letter from the Pacific Northwest Presbytery declaring that the Rev. Peter Leithart, in compliance with the fifth recommendation of the Federal Vision report adopted by last year’s GA has posted a public letter declaring the differences in his views.  Rev. Stellman also reports that he was elected to be one of the members of the study committee to look at Rev. Leithart views.  It is interesting to note that Peter Leithart, while apparently a member of Pacific Northwest Presbytery and therefore a PCA Teaching Elder, is pastor of Trinity Reformed Church in Moscow, Idaho.  The church is a member of the Confederation of Reformed Evangelical Churches (CREC).  The committee is to report back in January.
 
I think that to no one’s surprise the conversation about the Federal Vision controversy continues in the blogosphere.  In some cases it contains harsh criticism on both sides producing more heat than light.  But in others it is very civil and even sheds light on the nuances of the controversy.

One of the more interesting was a well as enlightening was a discussion held on the blog De Regno Christi back in late September.  If you look at their Federal Vision thread you can find a multitude of posts and comments about very specific points under discussion.

In another twist Jeff Meyers reports that an overture is being introduced in different presbyteries of the PCA about informing the presbytery if ordained individuals views differ from the standards.  The twist is that while the constitution and ordination vows refer to differences with the “Standards,” that being Westminster, the overtures refer to differences with the Federal Vision report, raising it to the level of constitutional standard.

Well, I think that is enough for now.  The discussion continues and will undoubtably surface at the PCA GA in June.

Overturn on appeal of Redwoods vs. Spahr: Synod PJC decision

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Thanks to Rev. Jane Adams Spahr’s web site we have a pdf with the scanned image of the Synod of the Pacific PJC decision overturning the Presbytery PJC acquittal of the Rev. Spahr for preforming same-sex weddings.  Since it is an image I won’t be including as many quotes from the decision as I might if I could cut and paste the text.

There were three points of appeal for the Presbytery of the Redwoods prosecuting team.  The substantial one was that the Presbytery PJC’s decision that same-sex weddings were not specifically prohibited by the PC(USA) Book of Order and a 1991 Authoritative Interpretation was in error.  By a vote of 6-2 the SPJC sustained this error citing the Book of Order, the 1991 AI, and the GAPJC case of Benton vs. Presbytery of Hudson River.  The decision says:

Taken as a whole, the Book of Order, the 1991 AI, and the Benton case, make clear that ministers are not to conduct ceremonies represented as marriages between persons of the same sex.  Regardless of the expression of conscience by the Rev. Dr. Spahr, she may not circumvent the standards of the Church.  Although the Rev. Dr. Spahr had acted with conscience and conviction, her actions were contrary to the constitution as it is authoritatively interpreted, is therefore subject to censure. [sic]

On two technical matters the SPJC sustained the errors unanimously.  The first was a PPJC commissioner who should have been recused because she participated with Rev. Spahr in another “marriage ceremony.”  The SPJC decision says

We view the likelihood of tainting the proceeding as substantial.  A 6-1 vote on the decision does not cure the error. In judicial proceedings avoiding the appearance of conflict of interest is critical.

The second technical matter was that the PPJC did not enter the decision on each charge separately in the decision.  They were advised to follow the proper procedures in the future.

The Synod PJC imposed the censure of rebuke.

There are two minority reports.  One signed by both dissenting commissioners argues that since these ceremonies are not an essential tenent of the Reformed faith they should be subject to freedom of conscience.  The second minority report, signed by only one of those two dissenting commissioners, argues that none of the cited authority actually prohibits ministers from preforming these ceremonies.

Since my initial post with the news, the Rev. Spahr has issued a press release which is posted on her web site quoting her as saying she is “deeply saddened that the church has chosen not to recognize these loving relationships.”  The press release is also posted at That All May Freely Serve.  I have seen nothing yet from the Presbyterian News Service.

The press release from Rev. Spahr does confirm that she will appeal to the GAPJC.